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I. INTRODUCTION
Direct democracy is on the rise.' While there is no federal initiative or
referendum, 2 a majority of states allow at least some version of direct
1. David B. Magleby, Let the Voters Decide? An Assessment of the Initiative and Referendum Process,
66 U. COLO. L. REV. 13, 26-31 (1995); Robert Pear, Debate on Whose Voice Is Heard in Initiatives, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 7, 1994, at B 1; Robert Pear, Number of Ballot Initiatives Is the Greatest Since 1932, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 5, 1990, at B10. For a description of the means and mechanisms of direct democracy, see infra
text accompanying notes 20-23.
2. For a discussion of the two, see infra text accompanying notes 20-23. See generally ALEXANDER
J. BOrT, HANDBOOK OF UNITED STATES ELECTION LAWS AND PRACTICES 267-98 (1990); Julian N. Eule,
Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE LJ. 1503, 1511-12 (1990) (describing initiatives and
referenda).
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democracy.3 Many state and local ballot measures have spawned divisive,
high-profile campaigns about issues as volatile as gambling, gay rights, and
gun control. The controversy surrounding ballot measures seems unlikely to
abate with the prospect of a 1996 initiative in California that would eliminate
affirmative action.4
Many controversial, highly visible ballot measures have posed serious
constitutional problems.5 Perhaps for that reason, legal scholars concerned
with the rise of direct democracy have focused almost exclusively on the
constitutional questions surrounding popular lawmaking.6 They have left
largely unexamined the judicial interpretation of popularly enacted laws: how
courts construe direct legislation when litigants contest statutory meaning rather
than constitutionality.7
This gap in the literature about direct legislation is both lamentable and
surprising. It is lamentable because many popular ballot measures are found
to be constitutional or are never challenged as unconstitutional. As these
measures are applied and interpreted, they raise the same problems of
ambiguity and prompt the same kinds of litigation over interpretation that are
so familiar in the context of legislative law. This gap in the literature is
surprising given that the last decade has produced so much new scholarship
3. Eule, supra note 2, at 1509-10.
4. See John Boudreau, Effort to Outlaw Affirmative Action Promoted in California: Civil Rights
Groups See Initiative as Political-Cultural Grenade, WASH. PoST, Dec. 27, 1994, at A3.
5. See, e.g., Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (striking down ballot measure that would require
voter approval of open housing laws); Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S.
Ct. 1092 (1995) (invalidating state constitutional initiative that would bar state and local government from
enacting laws banning discrimination based on sexual orientation); U.S. Judge Blocks Anti-Immigrant Bill,
WASH. PosT, Nov. 17, 1994, at A5 (stating that federal court had enjoined Proposition 187-which would
deny public benefits to undocumented immigrants-based on challenge to its constitutionality).
6. For an overview of the leading works and an argument in favor of heightened judicial review of
direct democracy, see Eule, supra note 2. For work exploring whether initiatives and referenda violate the
federal Guarantee Clause, see, e.g., Symposium, Guaranteeing a Republican Form of Government, 65 U.
CoLo. L. REv. 709 (1994); Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not "Republican Government":
The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 19 (1993). For work exploring whether direct
democracy systematically violates the Equal Protection Clause or otherwise subjugates minorities, see, e.g.,
Lynn A. Baker, Direct Democracy and Discrimination: A Public Choice Perspective, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REv.
707 (1991); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy's Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L.
REv. 1 (1978); Symposium, The Bill of Rights vs. The Ballot Box: Constitutional Implications of Anti-Gay
Ballot Initiatives, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 491 (1994) [hereinafter Symposium, Anti-Gay Ballot Initiatives]. On
the more general question of whether popular initiatives should be subjected to heightened judicial review,
see Robin Charlow, Judicial Review, Equal Protection and the Problem with Plebiscites, 79 CORNELL L.
REV. 527 (1994).
7. Three pieces of published student work are exceptions. See Kara Christenson, Note, Interpreting
the Purposes of Initiatives: Proposition 65, 40 HASTINGS LJ. 1031 (1989); Elizabeth A. McNellie, Note,
The Use of Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Popularly Enacted Legislation, 89 CoLUM. L. REv. 157
(1989); Stephen H. Sutro, Comment, Interpretation of lnitiatives by Reference to Similar Statutes: Canons
of Construction Do Not Adequately Measure Voter Intent, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 945 (1994). See
generally J. Clark Kelso, California's Constitutional Right to Privacy, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 327, 334-75 (1992)
(analyzing interpretation of California initiatives in context of California's constitutional initiative protecting
individual privacy).
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about statutory interpretation. Scholars have called into question basic
premises about traditional approaches to statutory interpretation and have
proposed and debated many new approaches.' None of this work has
addressed the special-and increasingly significant-context of direct
democracy.
Direct democracy, moreover, can provide a revealing window on the study
of statutory interpretation more generally. The search for a controlling
legislative intent has traditionally framed the judicial interpretation of statutes.
The viability of such "intentionalism' has long been discredited by scholars
and is sharply undermined by widespread contemporary skepticism about
objective theories of meaning and about the pluralist political process from
which statutes emerge." Nevertheless, judges continue to deploy the language
of legislative intent when they interpret statutory law-perhaps because they
believe in the idea of intent, perhaps because they believe their legitimacy
depends upon the appearance that they are vindicating the legislature's policy
preferences and not their own.
The case of direct democracy tests the limits of judicial willingness to
deploy intentionalist methodology. There are reasons to suspect that a search
for "popular intent" will be even more problematic than the traditional search
for legislative intent. Consider, for example, the mass size of the electorate; the
absence of legislative hearings, committee reports, or other recorded legislative
history; and the inability of citizen lawmakers to deliberate about, or to amend,
proposed ballot measures. In addition, voters are not professional lawmakers,
so it is problematic to impute to the electorate the same knowledge about law,
legal terminology, and legislative context that courts routinely ascribe-if
sometimes only as aspiration-to legislators. These structural dynamics of the
direct lawmaking process should further burden what is in any circumstance
a problematic quest for the single intent underlying a law.
In this Article, I explore the interpretive methodology used by courts in
construing statutory law enacted through the initiative process. My point of
departure is a set of fifty-three decisions I have collected that represents ten
years of published decisions by the highest courts in the jurisdictions that
permit voters to enact statutory law through the initiative. I use these decisions
to explore empirical and normative questions about the interpretation of
initiative laws.
8. See Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory
Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 241 (1992).
9. I have argued that much of this work can be understood in terms of a new conception of democratic
legitimacy in statutory interpretation. See Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of
Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1995).
10. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 525
(2d ed. 1995).
11. See, e.g., Schacter, supra note 9, at 599-606 (discussing skepticism about pluralism and statutory
meaning that undermines traditional principles of statutory interpretation).
[Vol. 105: 107
The Pursuit of "Popular Intent"
The decisions point to two emlirical conclusions, one about the
interpretive approach courts use and the other about the interpretive sources
courts consult. In terms of approach, the courts studied widely invoke the same
intentionalist principles that dominate conventional statutory construction,
replacing the familiar search for legislative intent with an asserted search for
the controlling popular intent. In terms of sources, the decisions reflect that
courts rely heavily on formal interpretive sources, such as statutory text,
language in related legislation, judicial opinions, canons, and, on occasion,
ballot pamphlets or voter guides (used in lieu of legislative history).
Conversely, courts widely ignore media and advertising as sources of popular
intent even though, as I will explore in depth, social science research about
voter behavior in ballot campaigns suggests that voters most regularly consult
and seek guidance from these sources.
These empirical findings provide the basis for the normative analysis that
follows. I draw three principal conclusions. First, the popular intent behind an
initiative statute is largely illusory and provides an unstable anchor for judicial
interpretation. The popular-intent approach reproduces-and sometimes
aggravates-many of the problems posed by the legislative-intent approach,
and then raises significant new problems of its own. I explore, in particular,
the ways in which the popular-intent approach falls to account for problems
of severely limited popular foresight and for the ways in which the direct
lawmaking process gives powerful leverage to initiative drafters, who are
situated to construct a phantom popular intent through strategic drafting.
Moreover, the decisions analyzed here, when read against the social science
work about initiative campaigns, point to an interestifig paradox that further
suggests that popular intent cannot be ascertained: The hierarchy of interpretive
sources courts employ inverts the informational hierarchy voters use in
determining how to vote. This problem eludes easy solution because courts
would create formidable new problems if, in the service of popular intent, they
inverted their own interpretive hierarchy in order to track voter practices. All
of this suggests that the pursuit of popular intent is doomed to fail.
Second, the problems of popular intent suggest a deeper underlying issue,
one that should frame attempts to rethink the interpretation of direct legislation.
I argue that the interpretive dilemmas explored reflect a striking disjunction
between two competing conceptions of law-one that I call "positivist" and
one "popular." The tension between the two supplies a larger conceptual
context in which to understand the problems of popular intent; it also helps to
point toward a different approach to interpretation of direct legislation.
More specifically, I argue that, rather than remaining wedded to
intentionalist methodology, courts construing direct legislation should concede
the limits of popular intent and develop alternative interpretive rules framed in
light of some of the problems that characterize the direct lawmaking process.
In calling for new interpretive principles of this kind, I apply and build upon
1995]
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what I have called in previous work a "metademocratic" approach to statutory
construction. 12 The metademocratic approach acknowledges the inevitability
of interpretive discretion and the centrality of the rules used to resolve
ambiguity, focuses upon choosing interpretive rules that are self-consciously
designed to address identified problems in the democratic process, and links
democratic legitimacy not to a mythic brand of interpretive "restraint" but to
the use of default principles designed to further a larger vision of
democracy.13 I argue that metademocratic rules applied in the context of
popularly enacted laws can help to generate a less idealized picture of the
direct lawmaking process than judicial rhetoric now suggests, can respond to
some of the characteristic problems courts confront when trying to "read" the
mass electorate, and can encourage other institutions to reform the initiative
process.
Third, understanding the particular ways in which popular intent fails, and
the underlying disjunction it exposes between positivist and popular
conceptions of law, has implications beyond popular lawmaking. Critical
analysis of how courts construe direct legislation helps to reveal new
dimensions of the problems of conventional statutory interpretation and
generates fresh insights about the legislative process.
In Part II, I provide a short overview of direct democracy in the states,
with a focus on provisions for the statutory initiative. In Part II, I describe the
decisions I have collected and what they reveal about the interpretive
methodology employed by courts. In Part IV, I critique the prevailing popular-
intent approach on several counts. In Part V, I explore possible responses to
the interpretive dilemmas suggested by the decisions analyzed and propose a
more promising approach. I conclude with some thoughts about the
implications of the study for conventional statutory interpretation.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF POPULAR LAWMAKING IN THE STATES
Direct democracy aspires to a kind of self-government that is less filtered
and mediated than that which representative democracy can provide. 4 Its
participatory impulse is traceable to Greek city-states and Roman
plebiscites.' 5 In this country, mechanisms for direct democracy-ranging from
12. See id. at 606-11.
13. Id.
14. One advocate of the initiative and referendum process argues that:
The initiative broadens the reach of American democracy. The mechanism gives popular mass
movements the ability to develop legislative vehicles and secure a date for verdict from fellow
citizens. In a manner unmatched in any nation other than Switzerland, the initiative is an
expression of confidence in ourselves, a reaffirmation of the confidence of the Framers: that free
men and women can govern themselves.
PATRICK B. McGUIGAN, THE POLITICS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE 1980S, at 121 (1985).
15. HARLAN HAHN & SHELDON KAMIENIECKI, REFERENDUM VOTING: SOCIAL STATUS AND POLICY
PREFERENCES 8 (1987). For historical overviews of the use of initiatives in the U.S. and other modem
[Vol. 105: 107
The Pursuit of "Popular Intent"
town meetings to popular constitutional ratification-date to colonial
government.16 American popular lawmaking most dramatically ascended,
however, with the rise of the Progressive movement in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. 7 Given that Progressive reformers targeted
"politicians, parties, interest groups, and political institutions,""8 it is
unsurprising that the Progressives emphasized the importance of
institutionalizing direct democracy. Between 1898 and 1918, twenty-three
states enacted the initiative, the referendum, or both. 9
The mechanisms of direct democracy are diverse, and states and
municipalities use many different forms of popular lawmaking.20 Voters may
remove elected officials through the device of recall,2 or they may enact
substantive law at the polls. State provisions for enacting substantive law vary
widely among the jurisdictions. Depending on state law, voters may adopt state
constitutional provisions, statewide statutory law, or local ordinances. Voters
may enact such law by either the initiative or the referendum. Initiatives permit
voters to initiate and vote upon proposed laws without any required legislative
approval;' referenda, by contrast, involve laws that a legislative body has
referred to the electorate for ratification. 23
In order to situate this analysis within the broader context of statutory
interpretation, I focus exclusively here on direct democracy's closest analogue
to the statutory product of state legislatures: the statewide statutory initiative,
which permits voters to propose and pass statutes without legislative approval.
Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia permit voters to enact
states, see THoMsAs E. CRONIN, DiRECr DEMOCRACY: THE POLrrICs OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND
RECALL 7-59 (1989); DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECt LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES 27-34 (1984); DAVID D. SCHMIDT, CITIZEN LAWMAKERS: THE BALLOT INITIATIVE
REVOLUTION 3-23 (1989).
16. HAHN & KAMIENIECKI, supra note 15, at 8-9; SCHMIDT, supra note 15, at 3-4.
17. MAGLEBY, supra note 15, at 21-25; SCHMIDT, supra note 15, at 5-14.
18. HAHN & KANHENIECKI, supra note 15, at 11.
19. CRONIN, supra note 15, at 51.
20. For comprehensive, state-by-state listings, see 29 THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE
BOOK OF THE STATES 329-43 (1992).
21. See CRONIN, supra note 15, at 125-56.
22. Initiatives are either "direct" or "indirect." A direct initiative requires that sponsors of a proposed
measure secure the required number of signatures and, once the measure is on the ballot, that a majority
of the voters approve the law. Eule, supra note 2, at 1510-11. Some states additionally require that a
specified percentage of the voters who turn out for the election cast a vote for the law. Id. at 1510-11 n.27.
In contrast, an indirect initiative requires that the legislature have an opportunity to enact the proposed law
on its own before the measure is put on the ballot. The measure goes to the voters only if the legislature
fails to do so within a specified period.
23. Referenda are, to use Julian Eule's categories, "mandatory," "voluntary," or "popular." See id. at
1512. A referendum is mandatory when the state's constitution requires that certain laws be submitted to
the voters before they are finally approved. A referendum is voluntary if state law permits legislators to
determine whether a law will be referred to the electorate. A referendum is popular if voters may, by
petition, require that a law be submitted to the electorate before it becomes effective. Id.; see also
MAGLEBY, supra note 15, at 35-36 (distinguishing among different forms of direct legislation).
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statewide statutes through the initiative.24 I do not examine referendum
measures, which present a hybrid between direct and representative legislation.
In addition, consistent with my focus on statutory law, I do not explore here
the interpretation of constitutional or local initiatives. It is unlikely that courts
deploy substantially different interpretive rules when they construe initiative
statutes as opposed to constitutional amendments or local ordinances.'
Insofar as the interpretive approach explored here predominates in these other
settings, my analysis of the interpretation of direct democracy has important
implications for those settings. Constitutional and local initiatives warrant
separate consideration, however, because factors particular to those measures
shape the context in which they are enacted and should be accounted for in
analyzing and developing appropriate interpretive rules.26
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF INITIATIVE STATUTES:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE DECISIONS
A. Profile of the Decisions Studied
1. Search Criteria
The fifty-three decisions I have collected meet several search criteria, and
they constitute all of the decisions located that fit within these parameters.27
24. These jurisdictions are: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, the District of Columbia,
Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. PHIuP L. DUBOIS & FLOYD F.
FEENEY, IMPROVING THE CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE PROCESS: OPTIONS FOR CHANGE 14 (1992); see also infra
Appendix A (listing, for each jurisdiction, constitutional or statutory source of power to enact statutes
through popular initiative).
25. For examples of decisions construing constitutional and local measures that invoke the intent-based
principles that I find predominant in the construction of statutory initiatives, see Davis v. Berkeley, 794
P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1990) ("When construing a constitutional provision enacted by initiative, the intent of
the voters is the paramount consideration."); Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1349 (Colo. 1994), cert.
granted, 115 S. Ct. 1092 (1995) (stating that, for purposes of determining whether unconstitutional
provisions are severable, court looks to "'(I) the autonomy of the portions remaining after the defective
provisions have been deleted and (2) the intent of the enacting legislative body"' (quoting Robertson v. City
of Denver, 874 P.2d 325, 335 (Colo. 1994))); City of Spokane v. Taxpayers of Spokane, 758 P.2d 480, 483
(Wash. 1988) (stating that, in construing a local initiative, "[j]udicial interpretation should focus on 'the
voters' intent and the language of the initiative "as the average informed lay voter would read it. .....
(quoting Estate of Turner v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 724 P.2d 1013, 1015 (Wash. 1986))).
26. For purposes relevant to my analysis, constitutional enactments differ from statutes because of their
greater durability and resilience. See MAGLEBY, supra note 15, at 72. For example, initiative statutes, unlike
constitutional amendments, are subject to legislative amendment or repeal in many jurisdictions. DUBOIS
& FEENEY, supra note 24, at 44-46. Local initiatives and referenda differ from statewide measures because
of the limitations state law characteristically imposes on local lawmaking power and the resulting
preemption issues that local initiatives frequently raise. See generally Clayton P. Gillette, Plebiscites,
Participation, and Collective Action in Local Government Law, 86 MICH. L. REV. 930 (1988).
27. A complete list of the cases and a description of the interpretive question raised in each one
appears in Appendix B. My research assistants and I used three means to locate these cases. First, we
located cases using relevant key numbers in West Publishing's digest system and any case annotations
accompanying the published state code and constitutional provisions that authorized the statutory initiative.
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The search criteria were designed to locate recent decisions of the highest court
in each jurisdiction in which statutory initiatives are interpreted. Consistent
with this objective, the criteria for inclusion were:
(1) the decision was issued between January 1, 1984 and December 31,
1994;
(2) the decision was from the highest court of the state or the District of
Columbia;
(3) the decision interpreted a statewide statute passed by initiative (but not
a constitutional measure or a referendum statute);28 and
(4) the decision construed and applied a provision of the measure at issue
(as opposed to deciding whether the initiative is constitutional or
construing the initiative solely in connection with a determination of its
constitutionality).
2. Geographic Composition of the Decisions
The decisions represent eleven jurisdictions-ten states and the District of
Columbia.29 California cases heavily dominate the set. Of the fifty-three
decisions collected, thirty are decisions of the California Supreme Court. That
fact is unsurprising given California's heavy usage of direct lawmaking.3°
Notwithstanding the predominance of California decisions, however, the
principal results I describe are consistent throughout the set of decisions and
do not change substantially when the California decisions are omitted."
Of the twenty-one states that permit the statutory initiative, eleven are
unrepresented in the set of decisions. For some states, this is because-
Second, we crafted three broadly worded searches for computerized databases. See Memorandum from Jane
Schacter, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin-Madison, to The Yale Law Journal 2-3 (July
29, 1995) (on file with author) [hereinafter Schacter Memorandum]. Third, we included any cases that the
cases found through the first two means cited and that met the search criteria, even though the first two
methods did not directly discover them. We tabulated and analyzed only majority opinions. We excluded
cases that construed a provision initially enacted through the initiative where the opinion indicated that the
provision at issue was subsequently amended by the legislature. Either I or at least two research assistants
analyzed each case that fit the search criteria.
The search strategies employed might have missed some cases, but several factors make the methods
unlikely to have produced a biased set of state supreme court cases over the last decade. First, the use of
existing secondary sources (digests and annotations) as well as broad database searches should have
minimized the risk of substantial error. Second, the cases I do examine reveal strong trends across the data
set; moreover, the cases refer to no body of law reflecting a divergent methodology. Third, the only cases
that might have eluded the search strategies employed here in any systematic way would be those that made
no mention of the initiative character of the statute or the fact that the voters enacted the law. Cases in
which courts do not even advert to the popular origins of a law-even if they exist in any substantial
number-are unlikely to be inconsistent with my central finding that courts widely use traditional methods
and sources of statutory construction when they interpret initiative laws.
28. See supra note 26.
29. The jurisdictions are: Alaska, Arkansas, California, the District of Columbia, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Oregon, South Dakota, and Washington.
30. See DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 24, at 18 (showing that California led all states in number of
initiatives appearing on ballots between 1978 and 1988).
31. Where relevant, I discuss any differences between California and the other jurisdictions.
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constitutional authority for initiatives aside-the devices are rarely, if ever,
invoked.32 For others, it appears that local culture may favor the use of either
the constitutional initiative (which provides more durability than its statutory
counterpart) or the referendum device (which requires legislative action).3
Thus, the decisions collected here do not reflect the full geographic diversity
of all states that permit the statutory initiative, but my research has not
revealed evidence that courts in the unrepresented jurisdictions use any
substantially different interpretive methodology in construing popularly enacted
constitutional provisions or local ordinances.' The set of decisions collected
here should not be regarded as exhaustive; it is intended only to capture recent
judicial practice (defined as the last ten years), and only to examine the
methodology used or approved by the authoritative appellate court in each
32. DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 24, at 18 (listing number of initiative measures voted upon between
1978 and 1988 and displaying low numbers for several jurisdictions). Between 1978 and 1988, for example,
no statutory initiatives appeared on the Wyoming ballot; only one statutory initiative appeared on the ballot
in Arkansas, Nevada, and Oklahoma; and only two statutory initiatives appeared on the ballot in Ohio. Id.;
see also MAGLEBY, supra note 15, at 71 (listing totals for period between 1898 and 1979 and indicating
low usage in several states).
33. For example, there is evidence to suggest that Colorado organizers have preferred the constitutional
over the statutory initiative: From 1978 to 1988, only five statutory initiatives appeared on the ballot, as
compared to 11 constitutional initiatives. DuBois & FEENEY, supra note 24, at 18; see also MAGLEBY,
supra note 15, at 72 (noting that in eight states there were more constitutional than statutory initiatives
between 1898 and 1978). Along similar lines, there is evidence to suggest that residents of Maine have
preferred the referendum to the statutory initiative. Between 1898 and 1978, 124 statutory referenda were
introduced in Maine, as compared to only 12 statutory initiatives. Id. at 73. This referendum preference may
be related to the fact that voters approve referenda at a far higher rate than they do initiatives. See id. at
72 (noting 60% aggregate success rate for referenda between 1898 and 1978 compared to 32-37%
aggregate success rate for initiatives). This approval-rate factor would not explain states that prefer the
constitutional initiative to the statutory one since voters in those states appear to approve statutory
initiatives at a higher rate than they approve constitutional initiatives. l at 72 (noting that from 1950 to
1980, voters in all relevant states combined approved 42% of statutory initiatives compared to only 30%
of constitutional initiatives).
34. One Nebraska case falling outside the scope of the study points in a different direction. In Omaha
Nat'l Bank v. Spire, 389 N.W.2d 269 (Neb. 1986), the Nebraska Supreme Court, in the course of
construing a constitutional initiative, held that it would consider the provision's language alone in
determining the voters' intent. The court stated:
There is no meaningful way to determine the intent which motivates voters to sign a petition
for the submission of an enactment, nor is there any real way to determine the intent of those
voters who vote for the adoption of an enactment. The motivations and mental processes of the
voter in Verdigre or the elector in Elkhom cannot be determined--except from the words of the
enactment itself. Beyond that, all that can be known by this court is that the voters have been
subjected to tornadolike winds in voting on this highly political question. We hold that the
intent of the voters adopting an initiative amendment to the Nebraska Constitution must be
determined from the words of the initiative amendment itself.
Id. at 279. Although the Nebraska court made these comments in the context of constitutional
interpretation-and no cases were located from the periods being studied in which that court interpreted
an initiative statute-it seems likely that the court would take the same position in the context of initiative
statutes, since the identified factors apply equally to statutes. However, other Nebraska decisions seem to
adopt the same intent-based principles that dominate the cases studied here and do not restrict courts to the
initiative's language alone. See State ex rel. Spire v. Beermann, 455 N.W.2d 749, 752 (Neb. 1990)
(construing voter-approved constitutional amendment and looking to '"intent and understanding' of framers
and people (quoting State ex rel. State Ry. Comm'n v. Ramsey, 37 N.W.2d 502, 507 (Neb. 1949))); State
ex rel. Douglas v. Beermann, 347 N.W.2d 297, 305 (Neb. 1984) (construing voter-approved constitutional
amendment and looking to "intent of the people").
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jurisdiction. It should, however, yield a relatively accurate representation of the
universe it attempts to describe.
B. The Interpretive Methodology Used by the Courts
The decisions reveal clear answers to two principal questions: What
interpretive approach and what interpretive sources do the courts studied
employ in assigning meaning to contested provisions?
1. The Primacy of Popular Intent
In the vast majority of the decisions collected here, the courts declare that
their task is to locate the controlling popular intent behind the provision at
issue. Of the fifty-three decisions, forty-five (or eighty-five percent) invoke
some variant of popular intent.35 Of the eleven jurisdictions represented, eight
embraced the popular-intent approach during the time period studied; the other
three were silent on the question.36 In most of the decisions analyzed, courts
explicitly identify popular intent as the object of their interpretive search, using
phrases like "the 'collective intent' of the people,
' 37 "'the voters' intent,"' 38
"the people['s] inten[t], '39 the "intent of the legislative body; in this case, the
electorate, ' 40 or the "'intent of the enacting body."'' 41 A few of the decisions
are more indirect in their embrace of popular intent, but they too suggest that
35. Schacter Memorandum, supra note 27, at 3-8. The data that form the basis for summaries of the
decisions referred to in this Article are set out in this memorandum. See id. at 8-14.
36. Each of the three "silent" states-Alaska, Michigan, and South Dakota-has only one case in the
set. None of these cases expressly or by implication rejects intent-based interpretation; the courts assign
meaning to the contested provision without identifying their interpretive methodology. Moreover, there is
evidence that, in cases outside the study, courts in these three states have approved the use of intent-based
construction in interpreting popularly enacted law. See, e.g., Thomas v. Bailey, 595 P.2d 1, 4 & n.15
(Alaska 1979) (noting that, in construing popularly enacted constitutional amendment, "[tihe basic
principles for interpreting statutes apply," and court may consider "evidence on the meaning the voters
probably placed on the provision"); Association of Businesses Advocating Tariff Equity v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 420 N.W.2d 81, 85 & n.8 (Mich. 1988) (construing referendum provision based on presumption
that voters "'know what they want' and "'understood the proposition,"' and invoking rule that a "statute
must be construed as a whole in order to effectuate the intent of the Legislature" (quoting In re Proposals
D & H, 339 N.W.2d 848, 854 (Mich. 1983))); Winter v. Shafter, 26 N.W.2d 893, 896 (Mich. 1947) (noting
that, in construing popularly enacted local charter amendment, court must "ascertain and give effect to the
intent of the electorate with due regard to the circumstances and the purposes sought to be accomplished");
Cummings v. Mickelson, 495 N.W.2d 493, 498-99 (S.D. 1993) (noting that, in construing popularly
enacted constitutional amendments, "the legislative history and historical background" are relevant, and that
"[p]articularly applicable in the case of amendments are the rules relating to the intent of the framers and
adopters and attainment of the object of a constitution").
37. Lemon v. United States, 564 A.2d 1368, 1381 (D.C. 1989) (quoting Washington State Dep't of
Revenue v. Hoppe, 512 P.2d 1094, 1096 (Wash. 1973)).
38. Estate of Turner v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 724 P.2d 1013, 1015 (Wash. 1986)
(quoting In re Estate of Hitchman, 670 P.2d 655, 657 (Wash. 1983)).
39. North Shore Vocational Regional Sch. Dist. v. City of Salem, 471 N.E.2d 104, 107 (Mass. 1984).
40. State v. Gallant, 764 P.2d 920, 922 (Or. 1988).
41. Yoshisato v. Superior Court, 831 P.2d 327, 334 (Cal. 1992) (quoting In re Lance W., 694 P.2d
744, 754 (Cal. 1985)).
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popular intent guides the court's inquiry.42 On occasion, courts mention what
they deem to be the voters' purpose43 in enacting the initiative, but in doing
so they retain a framework in which the intent of the electorate remains the
doctrinal foundation.44
None of the decisions meeting my search criteria contains any language
that explicitly rejects the popular-intent concept. There are, for example, no
express indications in the decisions studied that some courts chose to forsake
the search for the subjective popular intent behind a statutory provision in
favor of the assertedly objective "plain meaning" approach of the kind so
vigorously espoused by Justice Antonin Scalia. The hallmark of this "new
textualism" is its emphasis on statutory language and the "reasonable" meaning
of the words used in a law.45 Textualists view legislative intent as irrelevant
on the theory that only a statute's text is subject to the constitutional
requirements of bicameralism and presentment and thus only the text represents
formal "law." Unenacted, unspecified legislative intentions, by contrast, escape
the rigors of bicameralism and presentment and thus cannot claim the
legitimacy of statutory text.
46
Even though fifteen decisions in the study rely exclusively on what the
courts deem to be clear and dispositive statutory language, that kind of reliance
on statutory language, without more, does not constitute textualist
methodology. On the contrary, many courts in the study explicitly characterize
statutory language as the best evidence of intent; when that language is clear,
they declare it unnecessary to consult other sources to discern intent. The
42. See, e.g., DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc., 828 P.2d 140, 145 (Cal. 1992) ("Thus, the voters understood
and intended Proposition 51 to eliminate joint liability only ...."); People v. Bigelow, 691 P.2d 994, 1006
(Cal. 1984) ("No legislative history illumines the adoption of this special circumstance. The ballot
arguments and other materials concerning the 1978 initiative do not address the subject."); Backman v.
United States, 516 A.2d 923, 926 (D.C. 1986) ("We must assume that the District voters relied on the
statutory definition of 'narcotic'....").
43. For a distinction between statutory "intent" and "purpose," see REED DICKERSON, THE
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 88 (1975) ("Mhe word 'intent' coincides with the
particular immediate purpose that the statute is intended to directly express and immediately accomplish,
whereas the word 'purpose' refers primarily to an ulterior purpose that the legislature intends the statute
to accomplish or help to accomplish.").
44. See, e.g., People v. Fritz, 707 P.2d 833, 835 (Cal. 1985) ("[Nlothing in the ballot analysis or
arguments which were before the voters suggests such a purpose."); Estate of Turner v. Washington State
Dep't of Revenue, 724 P.2d 1013, 1016 (Wash. 1986) ("[I]t is the function of this court to discern voter
intent behind Initiative 402.").
45. For explorations of textualism, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L.
REV. 621 (1990) (analyzing important theoretical underpinnings of Justice Scalia's textualism); William D.
Popkin, An "Internal" Critique of Justice Scalia's Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REv.
1133 (1992) (criticizing Justice Scalia's divergence from common law mode of adjudication); Nicholas S.
Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The "New" New Legal Process, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1597 (1991)
(characterizing Justice Scalia's textualism as reaction against legal process theory).
46. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 30 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (arguing that it is not task of judicial interpreters "to enter the minds of the Members
of Congress-who need have nothing in mind in order for their votes to be both lawful and effective-but
rather to give fair and reasonable meaning to the text of the United States Code, adopted by various
Congresses at various times").
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distinction is between the textualist's reliance on language as the only
legitimate embodiment of law and the intentionalist's reliance on language as
the preferred evidence of the controlling-if unenacted-legislative intent. The
opinions collected here generally use the language of the initiatives construed
in this second sense, as evidence of the popular intent.
In general, the decisions reflect that courts have transported to the context
of direct democracy the techniques and principles used to construe legislatively
enacted law.47 Of the fifty-three decisions studied, eleven expressly state that
ordinary rules of statutory interpretation should apply, twenty-five others
simply apply them, and the remainder are silent on the issue. A few decisions
acknowledge the difficulty of construing popularly enacted law,48 and a few
specifically say that the popular origins of the law support a construction
designed to effectuate the prerogatives and purposes of direct democracy.49
The overwhelming number of decisions analyzed here, however, apply ordinary
rules of interpretation to initiative laws.
2. The Sources of Popular Intent: The Dominance of
Formal Legal Sources
a. A Taxonomy of Sources
The decisions studied also suggest some definite conclusions about the
sources courts use to ascertain popular intent. In particular, there is little
indication that courts modify the interpretive sources they consult to
accommodate the particular structural dynamics of the direct legislative
process. One might expect the interpretive sources to differ from those used
in construing legislative law because of, for example, the absence of a
legislative record and the fact that voters are not professional lawmakers. The
47. These cases refute the assertion in McNellie, supra note 7, that courts do not use traditional
principles of interpretation when construing popularly enacted law. McNellie apparently characterized courts
as rejecting traditional methods of interpretation based on the fact that some courts used ballot pamphlets,
but not other extrinsic materials, such as media accounts, in construing initiatives. But that notion seems
erroneously to assume that courts do use media materials when construing legislative law. In fact, the use
of ballot pamphlets closely tracks the use of legislative history, which is the principal extrinsic source used
in traditional statutory construction. See infra notes 53, 55 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 799 P.2d
1220, 1235 (Cal. 1990) ("In order to further the fundamental right of the electorate to enact legislation
through the initiative process, this court must on occasion indulge in a presumption that the voters
thoroughly study and understand the content of complex initiative measures."); Lemon v. United States,
564 A.2d 1368, 1381 (D.C. 1989) ("The difficulties inherent in discerning the collective intent of a
legislative body ... are even more pronounced where the decision was made directly by the electorate.").
49. Yoshisato v. Superior Court, 831 P.2d 327, 333 (Cal. 1992) ("[W]e must bear in mind 'our solemn
duty jealously to guard the sovereign people's initiative power."' (quoting Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P.2d
274, 277 (Cal. 1982))); In re Estate of Thompson, 692 P.2d 807, 808 (Wash. 1984) ("[T]his court has
consistently applied the rule that such provisions will be liberally construed to the end that the right of
initiative be facilitated."); cf. SDDS, Inc. v. State, 481 N.W.2d 270, 272 (S.D. 1992) ('Were we to adopt
SDDS' argument, we would effectively defeat the referendum rights of this state's citizens.").
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decisions do not support that hypothesis. To the contrary, courts widely subject
citizen-lawmakers to the same standards as legislators5 and generally confine
their search to sources commonly used in construing legislative law. The one
exception, discussed at length below, is the use of official ballot materials
prepared in connection with proposed initiatives. Because courts use these
materials in lieu of legislative history, however, even this is not so unique to
the context of direct legislation.
In analyzing the sources courts consult in determining popular intent, I
divided the materials into two broad categories of interpretive evidence. The
"formal" category includes several sources of positive law or government-
generated materials; the "informal" category includes nonlegal,
nongovernmental sources.
i. Formal Sources
* Statutory Language. This category comprises the words of the statute
that the voters enacted. Although there are decisions in which the statute was
silent on the point at issue, it is explicit or implicit in all the decisions that
statutory language is a relevant source for interpretation.
* Legal Texts. This is a broad category designed to subsume the range
of legal provisions and materials that might inform statutory construction. I
included here other statutes, including statutes related to the one being
construed and statutes in effect before the enactment of the one being
construed; any legislative history available for such other statutes; judicial
decisions; administrative regulations, rulings, or other materials; and any other
legal text viewed by a court as relevant to interpreting the provision at issue.
I counted canons of statutory construction as a legal text, analogous for the
purposes of the study to a citation to a judicial decision for a rule or principle
of law. t I also considered a legal treatise referring to an existing legal
doctrine to be a legal text.
0 Official Ballot Material. All states that authorize the statutory initiative
require state government officials to generate and make available to voters
some information about the initiative. Ten states in all-four of which are
represented in the study-prepare a ballot pamphlet to give voters guidance
about ballot measures. 52 1 included in this category such ballot pamphlets or
voter guides; other ballot summaries, abstracts, or titles; arguments for and
50. Sometimes courts are explicit on this point. See Backman v. United States, 516 A.2d 923, 926
(D.C. 1986) ("We must hold the legislature and the citizenry to the same standards when interpreting the
laws they enact."); cf. Taxpayers, 799 P.2d at 1235 ("[Tjhis court must on occasion indulge in a
presumption that the voters thoroughly study and understand the content of complex initiative measures.").
51. See generally Symposium, A Reevaluation of the Canons of Statutory Interpretation, 45 VAND.
L. REV. 529 (1992).
52. States represented in the study that require a ballot pamphlet are: California, Massachusetts,
Oregon, and Washington. See DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 24, at 126-32.
[Vol. 105: 107
The Pursuit of "Popular Intent"
against a measure collected and disseminated by the government (though
frequently written by partisans in the battle); statements or analyses that state
law required the attorney general or other state official to perform; and any
other material about the ballot measure that state law or regulation required
that voters be provided.
ii. Informal Sources
* Media Reporting or Analysis. This category includes any newspaper,
television, or radio accounts concerning the ballot measure, including narrative
reporting, analysis, editorials, opinion pieces, or any other material published
in media sources, exclusive of advertising. This category also includes
published exit polls or other opinion surveys.
* Advertising. This category includes political advertising about the
ballot measure, including broadcast and print advertising and campaign
materials (such as handbills, posters, or bumper stickers).
0 Other. This category includes any informational sources-such as
dictionaries-that do not fall within any of the categories listed above.
b. The Frequency of Sources
Tables 1-3 below show the extent to which courts either relied upon as
authority or explicitly identified as legitimate any of the sources identified
above.53 There are clear patterns in the hierarchy of sources consulted by
courts.
53. The materials that a state supreme court identifies as legitimate are significant even if the court
does not rely upon them in a particular case because decisions by the highest court give guidance about
the boundaries of appropriate interpretation to lower courts, government officials, and litigants. There are
several instances in the cases in which a court identifies a source-such as a ballot pamphlet---as an
appropriate form of guidance on the question of intent but finds nothing relevant in the source. In order
to present the most complete picture of interpretive sources available to courts construing popularly enacted
law, I counted an observation of this sort as identification of a legitimate source. At the same time, the
vagaries of judicial rhetoric make it perilous to attempt a clear distinction, in every case, between what
courts identify as legitimate versus what they actually "rely upon." For this reason, I did not separate out
these two categories, and both kinds of references are included in the data summaries.
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NUMBEROF 53 53 22 1 0 3
DECISIONS
PERCENTAGE 100% 100% 42% 2% 0% 6%
TABLE 1. Sources Relied on or Identified as Legitimate-All Jurisdictions
(53 Decisions)1
4
STATUTORY LEGAL BALLOT MEDIA ADVERTISING OTHER
LANGUAGE TEXTS MATERIAL
NUMBEROF 30 30 16 0 0 1
DECISIONS
PERCENTAGE 100% 100% 53% 0% 0% 3%
TABLE 2. Sources Relied on or Identified as Legitimate-California (30 Decisions)
STATUTORY LEGAL BALLOT MEDIA ADVERTISING OTHER
LANGUAGE TEXTS MATERIAL
NUMBEROF 23 23 6 1 0 2
DECISIONS
PERCENTAGE 100% 100% 26% 4% 0% 9%
TABLE 3. Sources Relied on or Identified as Legitimate-Non-California Jurisdictions
(23 Decisions)
The data reveal heavy concentration-indeed, almost exclusive focus-on
formal sources. The frequency of usage of any of the three categories of
formal sources-language, other legal texts, and official ballot
material-exceeded that of any informal source by an overwhelming margin.
The opinions consistently used or identified as legitimate the statutory language
of the ballot measures and legal texts. Among formal sources, official ballot
material was also influential, although substantially less so than language and
legal texts. As Tables 2 and 3 reflect, this pattern holds true for California and
54. The data upon which Tables 1-3 are based are set out in Schacter Memorandum, supra note 27,
at 14-25.
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non-California decisions alike. Both sets of decisions reflect the fact that courts
use official ballot materials with some frequency, especially any ballot
pamphlet required by law to be provided to voters. California courts show the
greatest enthusiasm for ballot pamphlets, using or approving their use in fifty-
three percent of the decisions studied. These pamphlets are generally used like
legislative history. In the absence of committee reports, floor debate, and the
like, courts sometimes look to these booklets as legitimate evidence of voter
intent. It is not surprising that the California decisions reflect significantly
higher usage of ballot material (53%) than do the non-California decisions
(26%) given that, among the non-California jurisdictions studied, only three
require a ballot pamphlet 5
By contrast, the sources I characterized as informal played virtually no role
in judicial analysis of the laws at issue. Indeed, the only informal sources that
figured significantly-dictionaries-appear in the "other" category.
The findings regarding media and advertising sources are particularly stark:
With a single exception, the opinions studied never mentioned information
provided to voters by the news media or by advertisements. Only one case had
a majority opinion that mentioned a media source, and that reference was only
incidental. In Lemon v. United States,56 the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals construed an initiative imposing mandatory minimum sentences for
crimes committed with weapons. While the court chose a more expansive
interpretation of the sentencing provision based largely on its analysis of the
statutory language, it also cited as background an article in the Washington
Post that reflected the level of popular disgust with increased gun availability
and usage.
IV. READING THE MAss ELECTORATE: THE INTRACTABLE SEARCH FOR
POPULAR INTENT
A. Introduction: Some Characteristic Problems of Intentionalism
I turn now to evaluating the prevailing popular-intent approach and the
associated interpretive practices reflected in the decisions. In assessing an
avowedly intentionalist approach to statutory interpretation I do not, of course,
write on a clean slate. Dating to the work of Max Radin, intent-based statutory
interpretation has been the subject of continuous scholarly derision. The
55. See supra note 52. Because many states do not have published legislative history of the sort that
is abundant in the federal statutory context, however, these courts' relatively frequent overall use of ballot
pamphlets is notable.
56. 564 A.2d 1368, 1379 (D.C. 1989).
57. See Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REv. 863, 870 (1930) [hereinafter Radin,
Statutory Interpretation]; see also Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and
the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 401-06 (1950)
(critiquing indeterminacy of traditional canons of interpretation). Radin later had second thoughts about his
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attacks have been sufficiently unrelenting to prompt one observer to suggest
that intent-based interpretation "has no serious defenders in the academy.""8
Although the contemporary version of the critique is sometimes expressed in
terms of complex problems of collective action and "decision theory,"59 the
underlying idea remains the same simple but powerful notion argued by Radin:
It is fallacious to ascribe meaningful intentionality to a multimember body.
This entrenched scholarly skepticism about intentionalist principles of
statutory construction is, however, noticeably unmatched in the courts. The
longstanding academic critiques notwithstanding, intent-based approaches
continue to dominate at least the rhetoric of judicial interpretation--and the
decisions analyzed here suggest the same dominating rhetorical presence of
intentionalism in the realm of direct legislation. As I discuss later, it may be
that the invocation of popular intent is, in the end, only rhetorical.' For
purposes of this part, however, I take the courts' opinions at face value and
assess the interpretive methodology they profess to follow.
To some extent, popular intent simply reproduces familiar problems of
intentionalism writ large.62 For example, the problem of aggregating multiple
individual intentions, substantial as it is in the context of the legislative
process, is compounded by the daunting scale of direct lawmaking. Even if we
granted that individual voter intent existed-a dubious premise, I will
own critique. See Max Radin, A Short Way with Statutes, 56 HARV. L. REV. 388, 410-11 (1942)
(suggesting that his earlier statements were "too sweeping" and embracing purpose-oriented approach to
statutory construction).
58. Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis, 70
TEX. L. REv. 1073, 1087 (1992); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135
U. PA. L. REv. 1479, 1507 (1987) ("Scholars from a variety of viewpoints agree that the idea of legislative
intent is incoherent and that judges have substantial lawmaking discretion in applying statutes."). But see
Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. Rsv. 845,
864-66 (1992) (responding to traditional criticisms of legislative intent and arguing that a properly
conceived notion of intent can be meaningful); Martin H. Redish & Theodore T. Chung, Democratic Theory
and the Legislative Process: Mourning the Death of Originalism in Statutory Interpretation, 68 TUL. L.
REV. 803, 807-08 (1994) (calling for revival of intent-based interpretation through model of "textualist
originalism").
59. See, e.g., John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, Limitation of Statutes: Strategic Statutory
Interpretation, 80 GEo. L.J. 565, 568 (1992) (arguing that, under public choice theory, "democratic laws
will exhibit internal chaos and contradiction and will be arbitrary in their effects"); Kenneth A. Shepsle,
Congress Is a "They," Not an "It": Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 239 (1992)
(arguing that legislative intent is oxymoron because institutional forces shape legislative outcomes more
than does congressional consensus). For a general overview of these claims, see Schacter, supra note 9,
at 638-39. For a refutation of the argument that Arrow's theorem and the associated problems of cycling,
agenda manipulation, and strategic voting render legislative outcomes incoherent and ultimately
meaningless, see Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice
Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 2121, 2131-35 (1990).
60. See Schacter, supra note 9, at 598-99 & n.20.
61. See infra Subsection V.B.2.
62. See Kelso, supra note 7, at 347-48 (arguing that California courts "have fictionalized an 'electorate
intent' in much the same way that they have fictionalized a 'legislative intent"').
[Wo. 105: 107
The Pursuit of "Popular Intent"
argue-courts simply could not cumulate what may be millions of voter
intentions.63
Similarly, the exigencies of arithmetic complicate the problems caused by
language and its limitations. As is familiar in the legislative domain and well
beyond, it is problematic to assume that statutory language can
uncontroversially convey distinct and determinate legal commands or, more
generally, that any communication to voters about the substance of a proposed
law will be universally understood in a single way.64 The cases analyzed here
offer many examples: What is a "crime involving dishonesty" for purposes of
a voter-enacted impeachment rule?6 Is a nondefendant employer, immune
from suit under a workers' compensation law, a "responsible party" for
purposes of allocating liability among party-defendants under a tort reform
initiative?66 When have prior criminal proceedings been "brought and tried
separately" for purposes of a sentence enhancement rule?67
And this problem can be particularly vexing when law is enacted by a
large group of voters, diverse across many dimensions. Given the scale of the
mass electorate, "interpretive communities, 68 are likely to proliferate, and
aspects of experience or identity may mediate and influence the way meaning
is assigned to language or concepts.69 From whose vantage point, for
example, shall we ask whether, for purposes of a witness impeachment statute,
shoplifting is a "crime involving dishonesty" (as opposed, say, to one of
economic duress),70 or whether, for purposes of a mandatory minimum
sentencing statute, all accomplices to a robbery were "armed while engaged"
in the robbery if only one person in the group was carrying a weapon?7 On
occasion, moreover, proponents and opponents of ballot measures may quite
63. See, e.g., Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 799 P.2d
1220, 1230 n.7 (Cal. 1990) (noting that more than five million people voted on California's 1990 campaign
reform propositions). This point was expressly noted by the dissent in the recent Unites States Supreme
Court decision invalidating an Arkansas constitutional initiative that imposed term limits on federal
officeholders. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1911 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (noting in construing the purpose of the initiative that "inquiries into legislative intent are even
more difficult than usual when the legislative body whose unified intent must be determined consists of
825,162 Arkansas voters"). Compare the context of legislative democracy, where courts may be able to get
at least a glimpse of the individual intent of some legislators through materials like transcripts of legislative
proceedings, other legislative history, amendments proposed by particular legislators or groups of
legislators, press releases, or other public statements. Even information of this kind, however, does not
eradicate the problems of aggregation because the question of how to cumulate multiple intentions remains.
64. See Schacter, supra note 9, at 599-603 (discussing how skepticism about meaning has affected
statutory interpretation).
65. See State v. Gallant, 764 P.2d 920, 920-21 (Or. 1988).
66. See DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc., 828 P.2d 140, 141 (Cal. 1992).
67. See In re Harris, 775 R2d 1057, 1058 (Cal. 1989).
68. See generally STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE AuToarrY OF
INTERPRETVE COMMUNrrMES (1980).
69. See Schacter, supra note 9, at 623-25 (discussing problem of "epistemological pluralism" in
statutory interpretation).
70. See State v. Gallant, 764 P.2d 920, 920-21 (Or. 1988).
71. See Abrams v. United States, 531 A.2d 964, 965-66 (D.C. 1987).
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strategically deploy language and rhetoric to evoke targeted responses from
particular groups.72
These familiar issues compromise the coherence of popular intent, but they
will not be the focus of my discussion. In this part, I will discuss the three
principal problems that the decisions analyzed most clearly suggest. I begin
with a discussion of two problems-the limits of voter foresight and the
related problem of strategic drafting. I then turn to what I call the paradox of
the inverted informational hierarchy. These problems reveal significant
weaknesses in the interpretive practices used in the decisions and lay the
groundwork for developing a more promising approach to interpreting direct
legislation. Several of the problems I will discuss, however, also have
implications for the way we think about ordinary statutory interpretation. While
the structural dynamics of direct legislation throw these issues into relief, I will
argue in the concluding part of the Article that a consideration of these issues
in the context of direct legislation can also challenge some of the assumptions
about the legislative process that are sometimes regarded as uncontroversial.73
B. The Boundaries of Popular Foresight
One problem prominently illustrated by the decisions analyzed is that the
notion that voters had any intent at all on the interpretive question facing the
court-individually or collectively-is often untenable. That interpretive
question is frequently obscure, technical, or one that requires knowledge of a
body of related laws and doctrines. There is no particular reason to believe that
voters had anything at all in mind on such questions. This recalls Max Radin's
72. A vivid example drawn from outside the study is the highly strategic use of the phrase and idea
of "special rights" in the many campaigns around the country concerning proposed antigay initiatives. See,
e.g., Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F Supp. 417, 422 (S.D. Ohio 1994), rev'd, 54 F.3d 261
(6th Cir. 1995) (involving federal constitutional challenge to city charter amendment with title "No special
class status may be granted based upon sexual orientation, conduct or relationships"); cf. Evans v. Romer,
882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 1092 (1995) (involving federal constitutional
challenge to state constitutional amendment that prohibits "homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation,
conduct, practices or relationships" from being the basis of any claim to "minority status, quota preferences,
protected status or claim of discrimination"). Sometimes the phrase appears in the legislation, other times
it is the central slogan of the campaign. See generally William E. Adams, Jr., Pre-Election Anti-Gay Ballot
Initiative Challenges: Issues of Electoral Fairness, Majoritarian Tyranny, and Direct Democracy, 55 OHIO
ST. L.J. 583, 629-47 (1994) (setting out texts of several proposed antigay ballot measures). A close
examination of the rhetoric of special rights suggests that it is strategically designed to exploit perceived
white opposition to existing antidiscrimination law, notwithstanding that many who deploy it claim to
support existing law and to oppose only adding gay men and lesbians to the list of groups protected by
such laws. In a previous work, I analyzed the use of the rhetoric of "special rights" and argued that it is
deployed to challenge-covertly--the normative basis for all civil rights protections. See Jane S. Schacter,
The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding the Discourse of Equivalents, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 283, 300-07 (1994); see also Suzanne B. Goldberg, Facing the Challenges: A Lawyer's Response
to Anti-Gay Initiatives, 55 OHIO ST. LJ. 665, 670-72 (1994) (examining equation of civil rights with
special rights). The antigay initiative example underscores the complexity of assigning a universal "popular"
meaning to words used in laws, ballot pamphlets, media strategies, or elsewhere in initiative campaigns.
73. See infra Part VI.
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observation that the chance that several hundred legislators would have had the
same intention on a particular point, or that the point would even have
occurred to them in passing the law, could only be "infinitesimally small."74
The problem of limited foresight is, however, more severe for citizens than
for legislators. It is not only that many interpretive questions were not actually
foreseen, but that these questions are systematically unforeseeable to voters.
Ballot propositions are presented to voters largely in a legal vacuum,
unconnected in any specific way to the surrounding legal context.75 Because
of this lack of context, many of the interpretive issues that confront courts are
outside the plausible realm of voter contemplation. A vote in favor of a ballot
question will often signify, at best, an electoral judgment on the salient and
general policies in question, not on the rarefied points that often generate
interpretive litigation.
For example, when Massachusetts voters enacted Proposition 2 1/2 limiting
the charges that can be assessed against cities and towns, it is unlikely that
they either did consider or could have considered whether special independent
entities like the Boston Water and Sewer Commission could claim the
protection afforded cities and towns.76 Similarly, when Missouri voters passed
a law prohibiting electrical utilities from passing along construction expenses
to consumers before a new or renovated facility is operating, they most likely
had no reason to consider the possibility of a utility abandoning the
construction project entirely, or the legal questions that abandonment would
raise. 7 As is reflected in Appendix B, examples like these recur throughout
the cases analyzed.
Attributing legal knowledge of this sort to voters may lead to desirable
results, at least from the standpoint of promoting a coherent overall body of
law, but to characterize this knowledge as within the voters' contemplation is
implausible. There is no basis in the literature about initiative campaigns-or
in intuitions about elections and voters more generally-to believe that voters
have any detailed knowledge about the legal context surrounding the proposed
initiative. One can see the case for expecting legislative drafters to be aware
of such things as related and prior law, judicial interpretations of similar
language, and relevant interpretive canons that reviewing courts may apply.
Whether all legislators do, in fact, have this knowledge may be another matter,
but given the staff, legislative analyses, and other resources available to
professional lawmakers, it is reasonable enough to expect them to know
something about the "legal landscape" into which a new law will fit. Because
74. See Radin, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 57, at 870.
75. The ballot pamphlet can supply some limited legal context or explanation to voters, but it has
problems of its own. I discuss problems with the ballot pamphlet below.
76. See Boston Water & Sewer Comm'n v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 562 N.E.2d 470, 471 (Mass.
1990).
77. See State ex rel. Union Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 687 S.W.2d 162, 163-64 (Mo. 1985).
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this is not the case with ordinary voters, many of the legal consequences of
new initiative laws are systematically unforeseeable to citizen-legislators.
C. Drafter Intent and Phantom Popular Intent
A different but related problem reflected in the decisions studied is that
courts fail to account for structural features of the direct lawmaking process
that enable proponents and drafters of initiative laws to manipulate the concept
of popular intent. The discussion of limited popular foresight in the last section
introduced a point that is central here: Voters generally lack detailed
knowledge of the legal context surrounding a proposed initiative statute.
Similarly, voters are often unfamiliar with the technical legal jargon that is
used in the text of initiatives. Among the terms construed in the decisions
collected here are, for example, "joint and several liability, 79 "right of
contribution," 80 and "declarant."'" While largely incomprehensible to many
voters, these terms can trigger very precise and significant legal consequences.
The unfamiliarity of legal terminology to many voters creates powerful
leverage for the initiative's drafters, for it enables them to have an unseemly
private dialogue of sorts with the courts, who also understand these terms.
Through careful use of terminology, drafters can construct a desired-but
largely phantom-popular intent.
Given that this problem flows from a structural feature of the process-the
lack of familiarity of citizen-lawmakers with many technical legal concepts-it
should persist in some form even if we assume benign motivation on the part
of initiative drafters and organizers. That is, even if we assume that proponents
of initiatives do not try to exploit this informational advantage, the advantage
would still exist. However, this assumption of innocence seems increasingly
naive.8" The "initiative industry" has become more sophisticated, 83 and well-
financed, concentrated interests have begun to play a dominant role in the
initiative arena. One recent study, for example, reflects that business interests
made two-thirds of all contributions to initiative campaigns in California in
1990 and eighty-three percent of all contributions to the eighteen most
expensive initiative campaigns in that state between 1952 and 1990.'
78. I discuss various dimensions of this problem infra in Section IV.D.
79. DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc., 828 P.2d 140, 145-47 (Cal. 1992).
80. Bird-Johnson Corp. v. Dana Corp., 833 P.2d 375, 378-80 (Wash. 1992).
81. Whitman v. Superior Court, 820 P.2d 262, 267 (Cal. 1991).
82. See Pear, supra note 1, at B1l (describing increasing use of initiatives by business groups,
including California's tobacco industry).
83. See, e.g., MAGLEBY, supra note 15, at 59-76; Magleby, supra note 1, at 30; Timothy Egan, Debate
Over Pay for Ballot Initiatives, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1994, at A26.
84. See David B. Magleby, Direct Legislation in the American States, in REFERENDUMS AROUND THE
WORLD: THE GROWING USE OF DIRECT DEMOcRAcY 218, 243, 244 (David Butler & Austin Ranney eds.,
1994).
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With this sophistication and specialization comes the risk that the drafting
of popularly enacted law is becoming more susceptible to strategic behavior
of the kind that is quite typical in the legislative domain. One need not accept
the most extreme accounts of the legislative process offered by public choice
theorists to conclude that legislators frequently choose statutory ambiguity
based on strategic calculations about the political value of uncertainty.85
Similarly, initiative organizers and drafters, often assisted by political
consultants, may well find it expedient to use words chosen for ambiguity on
points likely to be controversial, and then to exploit that ambiguity carefully
during the campaign.86 To the extent that courts using the popular-intent
method assume not only that voters had an informed intent in relation to the
law, but also that the initiative's drafters sought to inscribe the law with a clear
meaning, courts are ignoring the power of drafters to manipulate the process.
In this way, the popular-intent approach enables small groups to appropriate
the political authority of the electorate through the leverage of statutory
drafting.
This risk of abuse is especially severe where the initiative is worded so
that the effect of a "yes" vote is unclear, 7 or where the ballot measure is so
lengthy or complex that legally significant details can easily be buried. 8
Some state laws attempt to address these problems indirectly by limiting
initiatives to a "single subject,"8 9 or by providing some mechanism for
official review of the initiative's language. Some states offer drafting assistance
to initiative petitioners, some mandate preballot review of the language or
"form" of the initiative, some require a state official to prepare the ballot
caption or title, and some authorize preelection judicial review to determine
whether proposed initiatives violate substantive or procedural limitations on
their use.90 In the vast majority of jurisdictions, however, the initiative's
85. For example, legislators might choose ambiguity over clarity because ambiguity leaves them room
to characterize selectively their vote for different constituencies, enables them to assemble a winning
coalition, or allows them to delegate controversial questions to a judicial or administrative interpreter.
SAMUEL MERMIN, LAW AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION 268 (2d ed. 1982); Schacter, supra
note 9, at 604-05. For broad perspectives on the problem of deliberate legislative ambiguity, see generally
MURRAY EDEiAiAN, THE SYmBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 22-72 (2d ed. 1985); THEODORE J. LowI, THE END
OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 92-126 (2d ed. 1979); DAVID
SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH
DELEGATION 3-21 (1993).
86. This phenomenon is readily apparent in the context of recent antigay initiatives; textual phrases
like "minority status" or "special rights" are undefined, yet they are subject to powerful symbolic use in
antigay initiative campaigns. See supra note 72 (discussing the rhetoric of "special rights").
87. See DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 24, at 121-22 (discussing voter confusion and data concerning
voters who vote contrary to their preferred outcome); MAGLEBY, supra note 15, at 144 (same).
88. See DUBOIS& FEENEY, supra note 24, at 113-14 (discussing problem of 'Trojan horse" provisions
in initiatives).
89. Daniel H. Lowenstein, California Initiatives and the Single-Subject Rule, 30 UCLA L. REv. 936,
936-38 (1983).
90. See generally DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 24, at 28-37 (reviewing state law provisions). For
an overview of preelection judicial review, see generally James D. Gordon 1I & David B. Magieby, Pre-
Election Judicial Review of Initiatives and Referendums, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 298, 298-300 (1989).
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petitioners do the drafting,91 and existing prohibitions on misleading
provisions are focused on relatively obvious attempts to mislead.92 Current
state laws thus fail to capture the full range of strategic behavior that may
shape the drafting of the initiative.
D. The Paradox of the Inverted Informational Hierarchy:
Mass Politics and Formal Law
Read against social scientists' descriptions of voter behavior in ballot
campaigns, the decisions analyzed suggest an intriguing paradox about the
sources of popular intent, one that draws sharply into question the
decipherability of mass electoral intentions. The formal source at the center of
judicial interpretation of initiative laws-statutory language-is widely ignored
by, or substantially incomprehensible to, voters. The same is true of legal texts
and, to a lesser extent, official ballot materials. At the same time, the sources
most heavily consulted by voters during the ballot campaign-media and
advertising-are widely ignored by courts and are, in any event, frequently too
diffuse, disparate, indeterminate, or biased to be effective as judicial sources
of popular intent. Put simply, the hierarchy of interpretive sources that courts
consult in the asserted service of locating popular intent is roughly inverse to
the hierarchy of informational sources that voters consult most regularly in
ballot campaigns. Moreover, as I discuss below, this situation cannot be easily
rectified by inverting the hierarchy of judicial sources in order to bring courts
and voters into line with one another because any such attempt would create
substantial problems of its own. Although some reforms might be possible at
the margin, the gap between what voters do and what courts do cannot, in all
likelihood, be fully closed.
In this section, I first discuss what social science research suggests about
voter reliance upon the informal sources that the decisions analyzed so
studiously avoided. I then discuss what the research suggests about voter use
and comprehension of the formal sources that courts privilege. Finally, I
consider why the gap between judicial and popular practices is likely an
enduring one.
91. See DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 24, at 28 (noting that "[o]nly six jurisdictions now formally
offer any form of drafting assistance to initiative proponents").
92. For a review of these types of state laws, see id. at 24-43. For an argument that additional
safeguards are needed, see CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FINANCING, DEMOCRACY BY INrIATIVE:
SHAPING CALIFORNIA'S FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 327-39 (1992) [hereinafter DBI]; DUBOIS &
FEENEY, supra note 24, at 161-73.
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1. Voters and the Media
The most comprehensive studies of voter behavior in ballot campaigns
demonstrate that media communications and political advertising are the most
important sources shaping how voters understand the initiative proposals on
which they are asked to vote. The judicial disregard of such sources reflected
in the decisions collected here is striking given the conclusion of David
Magleby's leading study of initiative and referendum processes that "[i]n
proposition elections, voters rely almost entirely upon the mass media for
information about propositions. This is true of both well publicized
measures ... and of relatively obscure legislatively initiated
measures .... 9' Along with other studies,94  the recent California
Commission on Campaign Financing's exhaustive look at California's
initiatives concluded that "the mass media emerge as the primary source of
information used to develop voter attitudes on ballot measures. News and paid
political advertising comprise the major sources of information voters use in
casting their ballots on initiatives." 95 Paid political advertising is especially
important in ballot campaigns where media coverage is not otherwise abundant
because thirty- and sixty-second spots are then the dominant mass images
available to voters. Although advertising is avowedly partisan and intended to
persuade rather than inform, it can play a central role in characterizing for the
electorate what is at stake in the campaign.96
These conclusions about the influence of mass communications are
reinforced by various surveys in which voters frequently identify as their
principal sources of information one media source 97 or a group comprising
several media sources. 98 Moreover, many voters report that they receive
93. MAGLEBY, supra note 15, at 133. Magleby's 1984 study remains the broadest and most extensive
empirical analysis of direct democracy. For more recent work by Magleby pursuing similar themes, see
Magleby, supra note 84; Magleby, supra note 1.
94. See, e.g., CRONIN, supra note 15, at 116-23 (1989); BErrY H. ZISK, MONEY, MEDIA AND THE
GRASs ROOTS: STATE BALLOT ISSUES AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 245-48 (1987); see also DUBols &
FEENEY, supra note 24, at 126 (noting primacy of newspapers and television among sources upon which
initiative voters rely).
95. DBI, supra note 92, at 198.
96. See ZISK, supra note 94, at 247 (noting that sloganeering commercials reduce complex measures
and are sometimes critical, especially for voters who do not read newspapers); see also CRONIN, supra note
15, at 118 ("In many states, the most important aspect of the media in issue elections is paid television
political advertisements.").
97. See DBI, supra note 92, at 247 (citing study ranking newspapers first, followed by ballot
pamphlets, then national and local television, respectively).
98. See, e.g., MAGLEBY, supra note 15, at 133 ("[F]or propositions, over 80 percent of the voters
reported that their most important source of information was television, radio, or newspapers."); ZISK, supra
note 94, at 248 (citing study finding that 80% of California public "relied strongly on a combination of
television information and group cues in reaching their voting decision, in contrast to the 'knowledgeable'
voters' reliance on newspapers").
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information about ballot questions from only one source, and for many that
source is the electronic media.99
These findings are not surprising given that ballot campaigns are by no
means the only political contests in which media and advertising play a
dominant role in supplying information and influencing voter attitudes. The
mass media are widely regarded as "the primary source of information about
public affairs received by most citizens."'" Thus, they have formidable
powers to frame and shape not only political campaigns, but "public
opinion"'' 1 more generally. 2 Many have argued that the mass media
derive substantial power from their "capacity to determine the content of public
concerns, to 'set the agenda' for public discussion."'1 3 In the context of
campaigns, this agenda-setting function means that the media often identify the
defining questions and set the boundaries of legitimate debate about the
issues.1 4 As part of this process, political advertising and the issues covered
by the news media influence one another in reciprocal ways."
99. See, e.g., MAGLEBY, supra note 15, at 134.
100. Michael Margolis & Gary A. Mauser, Public Opinion as a Dependent Variable: An Empirical
and Normative Assessment, in MANIPULATING PUBLIC OPINION: ESSAYS ON PUBLIC OPINION AS A
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 365, 366 (Michael Margolis & Gary A. Mauser eds., 1989) [hereinafter
MANIPULATING PUBLIC OPINION]; see also Robert Huckfeldt & Paul Allen Beck, Contexts, Intermediaries,
and Political Behavior, in THE DYNAMICS OF AMERICAN POLITICS: APPROACHES AND INTERPRETATIONS
252, 260 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Calvin Jillson eds., 1994) (characterizing television as "the dominant
medium for political information"). See generally ROBERT M. ENTMAN, DEMOCRACY WITHOUT CITIZENS:
MEDIA AND THE DECAY OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1989) (exploring relationships among mass media, elites,
and audiences and arguing for journalistic reforms that would better inform and engage citizens); DORIS
A. GRABER, MASS MEDIA AND AMERICAN POLITICS (3d ed. 1989) (describing mass media's role in
communicating, influencing, and shaping American politics).
101. For an analysis of the concept of "public opinion" that suggests intriguing parallels between that
concept and "popular intent," see VINCENT PRICE, PUBLIC OPINION (1992).
102. Helpful overviews appear in SHANTO IYENGAR, IS ANYONE RESPONSIBLE?: How TELEVISION
FRAMES POLITICAL ISSUES 132-34 (1991) (discussing mass media's role in politics and distinguishing
among "agenda-setting" "framing," "priming," and "bandwagon" effects); PRICE, supra note 101, at 80-83
(discussing ways in which media's "surveillance" and "correlation" functions shape public opinion);
Terence H. Qualter, The Role of the Mass Media in Limiting the Public Agenda, in MANIPULATING PUBLIC
OPINION, supra note 100, at 139, 140-52 (discussing role of media agenda setting in constructing a social
consensus); cf David 0. Sears, Symbolic Politics: A Socio-Psychological Theory, in EXPLORATIONS IN
POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 113, 128-30 (Shanto Iyengar & William J. McGuire eds., 1993) (discussing role
of "media framing" in symbolic politics).
There is a divergence of views among scholars as to the capacity of the mass media to change
people's political beliefs. For a review of these different perspectives and an argument suggesting that the
media can sometimes "move audiences in directions counter to their predominant- dispositions," see
ENTMAN, supra note 100, at 75-88.
103. Qualter, supra note 102, at 140; see Maxwell E. McCombs & Donald L. Shaw, The Agenda-
Setting Function of the Mass Media, 38 PUB. OPINION Q. 176 (1972) (examining role of city newspaper
and network television in setting agenda of issues in 1972 presidential campaign); Donald L. Shaw &
Shannon E. Martin, The Function of Mass Media Agenda Setting, 69 JOURNALISM Q. 902 (1992) (arguing
that news media encourage dialogue among diverse groups); cf. PRICE, supra note 101, at 81 (describing
media's "correlation function" as "bring[ing] together contrasting ideas and views within the attentive
public, report[ing] to its members what others think, and thus help[ing] to organize its collective reaction").
104. Qualter, supra note 102, at 146-47; cf GRABER, supra note 100, at 215-18 (describing how
simplistic and superficial coverage of issues that candidates emphasize forces electorate to base its voting
decisions on candidates' general personality characteristics).
105. See generally KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, DIRTY POLITICS: DECEPTION, DISTRACTION, AND
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Moreover, the role of the mass media in politics cannot meaningfully be
understood in terms of agenda-setting theory alone. As many theorists have
argued, in an age of ever more pervasive and dispersed mass communications
technology, the political process has come to be substantially constituted by the
welter of words, images, and ideas that television and other media sources
produce during elections." 6 According to this view, it is impossible to
distinguish clearly between domains of "media images" and "politics." The
media-especially television-necessarily play a powerful role in shaping and
constituting, rather than merely reflecting, politics and public ideas."t 7
To recognize that media and advertising shape politics in this way is not,
however, to say that the mass media can unilaterally impose particular political
meanings on the public. The media do not operate in a vacuum, but within the
social context that surrounds them. This is significant in several ways. In
epistemological terms, because broadcast and print journalists are themselves
part of the public, they necessarily draw upon "public language" and prevailing
"cultural 'maps' of the social world" as they communicate political ideas.'0 8
Those who report on politics stand within-and thus cannot operate entirely
independent of-the dominant narratives, conventions, and idioms of
contemporary politics. In more practical and immediate terms, the mass media
depend to a substantial extent upon others for the political information they
report. Sources thus play a central role in shaping political news.'09 Finally,
DEMOCRACY 127-49 (1992) (describing symbiotic relationship between political advertising and news
coverage).
106. See, e.g., MURRAY EDELMAN, CONSTRUCTING THE POLITICAL SPECTACLE (1988) (analyzing
pervasive consequences of shift from factual accounts to media imagery); DOUGLAS KELLNER, TELEVISION
AND TiE CRIsIs OF DEMOCRACY 149 (1990) (noting wide agreement "that television has become the
dominant force in U.S. politics, that presidential campaigns are now exercises in media politics, and that
elections are won and lost via television"); J.M. Balkin, What is a Postmodern Constitutionalism?, 90
MICH. L. REv. 1966, 1978 (1992) (discussing "mediazation" of politics); cf. EDWARD S. HERMAN & NOAM
CHOMSKY, MANUFACTURING CONSENT: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MASS MEDIA (1988) (arguing
that mass media work to "manufacture consent" for policies that serve entrenched, elite interests).
107. See ENTMAN, supra note 100, at 77 (arguing that "public opinion grows out of an interaction
between media messages and what audiences make of them"); KELLNER, supra note 106, at 133-77
(arguing that "television played an essential role in the creation of a conservative hegemony during the
1980's"). See generally JEAN BAUDRILLARD, SELECTED %WRITINGS 207, 210 (Mark Poster ed., 1988)
(positing "implosion of the social in the media" and arguing that "we will never in future [sic] be able to
separate reality from its statistical, simulative projection in the media").
108. STUART HALL ET AL., POLICING THE CRISIS: MUGGING, THE STATE, AND LAW AND ORDER 61,
54 (1978); id. at 57 (discussing "the media's mapping of problematic events within the conventional
understandings of the society"). Hall and his co-authors offer an elaborate analysis of the "social production
of news." Id. at 53-77; see also KELLNER, supra note 106, at 115 (arguing that media personnel "assimilate
certain views of the world, frames, codes and practices that they 'naturally' reproduce"); cf. JOHN FISKF,
TELEVISION CULTURE 292 (1987) (describing metaphors used in television news and noting that such
metaphors reflect an "institutional discourse shared between the news, the viewers, and, of course, the
politicians").
109. See DAN NIMIO & JAMES E. COMBS, MEDIATED POLITICAL REALITIES 170 (2d ed. 1990) ("A
close monitoring of political news reveals the result: From one-half to two-thirds of front-page stories of
major newspapers or lead stories in network TV news originate from official sources."); JUDITH S. TRENT
& ROBERT V. FRIEDENBERG, POLITICAL CAMPAIGN COMMUNICATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 25 (2d
ed. 1991) (noting that "[a]t each stage of the campaign, the relationships between candidates and the media
who cover them are vital not only to the candidate but to the individual media representative. The candidate
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in thinking about how the mass media shape politics and political
understandings, it is important to recognize that media communications are but
one part of a larger, multidimensional interpretive enterprise that produces
political understandings and meanings. To borrow media theorist John Fiske's
"intertextual" framework for analyzing television,110 media communications
and political advertising constitute only one "level" of the communicated
political "text." Subsequent media commentary about the political coverage and
advertising in a campaign,' as well as communications among voters about
political news and advertising and about political issues more generally, 12
comprise additional levels of the political text.
All of these factors suggest that the power of television, newspapers, and
advertising to mediate political realities" 3 should not be casually equated
with the more reductive notion that the mass media autonomously create
political realities. But this mediating power is nevertheless a formidable one
in politics, for as theorist Stuart Hall and his colleagues have noted, media
communications have a "reality-confirming effect,"' 14 as the "media 'take'
the language of the public and... return it to them inflected with dominant
and consensual connotations..' 115
In the context of ballot propositions, there is evidence that news and
advertising play a particularly prominent role in shaping the voting public's
understanding of initiatives." 6 Characterizations of the purpose and effect of
measures that are often complex can be crucial, for, as David Magleby notes,
a vote on a ballot question can only reflect what the voters understood the
needs the visibility... and the media need information.. ."). For more general analyses of the
newsgathering process, see HERBERT J. GANS, DECIDING WHAT'S NEWS 81 (1979) (arguing that sources'
access to journalists "reflects the social structure outside the newsroom; and because that structure is
hierarchical, the extent to which information about various parts of America is available to journalists is
hierarchically and differentially distributed"); HALL Er AL., supra note 108, at 58, 62 (arguing that
journalistic reliance on institutional or elite sources leads media to "reproduce symbolically the existing
structure of power in society's institutional order" and to "help close the circle by which the definitions
of the powerful become part of the taken-for-granted reality of the public by translating the unfamiliar into
the familiar world").
110. See FISKE, supra note 108, at 108. In his analysis of television, Fiske posits that there are three
levels of the television "text": first, the programs themselves; second, published commentary and publicity
about television programs; and third, the ways viewers understand and talk among themselves about what
they have seen. Id. at 108-27.
111. See, e.g., JAMmSON, supra note 105, at 127-33 (describing news coverage of campaign
advertising); NItMMO & COMBS, supra note 109, at 158-65 (describing television talk shows that "describe,
review and interpret the meaning of the major political news event of the past week").
112. See, e.g., Huckfeldt & Beck, supra note 100, at 261-64 (describing "personal discussion
networks" in which citizens discuss politics); Shaw & Martin, supra note 103, at 93 (arguing that mass
media produces political dialogue among diverse groups).
113. See generally NIMMO & COMBS, supra note 109, at 23-71 (discussing how television news
shapes viewers' understanding of current events).
114. HALL ET AL., supra note 108, at 62.
115. Id.
116. DBI, supra note 92, at 197-226; CRONIN, supra note 15, at 116-23; MAGLEBY, supra note 15,
at 133-37, 168-70; ZISK, supra note 94, at 245-48. On the agenda-setting role of initiative petitioners, see
Gordon & Magleby, supra note 90, at 298.
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question to be about.1 7 How the media characterize a ballot measure is
undoubtedly influenced by how the initiative's proponents draft, structure, and
"package" the measure, but once the measure is drafted and approved for the
ballot, media accounts and paid advertising assume the pivotal role in defining
the proposition for the voters.
Moreover, specific features of the popular lawmaking process underscore
the power of media images and characterizations to influence public
understanding in ballot campaigns. The initiative process frequently combines
increased information costs with decreased informational resources. Voters
confronted with a proposed initiative implicating complex questions of policy
have high associated information costs, 118 yet the strong candidate and party
cues that are often important proxies in traditional elections are absent.1 9 In
fact, some studies show that many voters are unwilling to wade into complex
ballot questions; they cast votes for candidates, but do not vote on propositions
that appear on the same ballot.12°
One recent analysis suggests that initiative voters "have little incentive to
acquire detailed information'121 and must, in the absence of familiar cues,
search for other "information shortcuts."'" Media reports and strategically
crafted advertising offer a ready and widely available source for such
shortcuts.'2 Prominent among such signals are, for example, endorsements
117. See MAGLEBY, supra note 15, at 141.
118. Arthur Lupia, Busy Voters, Agenda Control, and the Power of Information, 86 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 390 (1992); David Magleby, Opinion Formation and Opinion Change in Ballot Proposition
Campaigns, in MANIPULATING PUBLIC OPINION, supra note 100, at 95, 104.
119. DBI, supra note 92, at 198. The search for efficient political information is by no means confined
to ballot propositions. See generally ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 229
(1957) (discussing high costs of political information); Donald Granberg, Political Perception, in
EXPLORATIONS IN POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 102, at 70, 93 ("As a means of making sense of
the complex political reality and as a cognitive shortcut, political cue theory depicts people as developing
schemas.").
120. See CRONIN, supra note 15, at 67 (asserting that a "5 to 15 percent dropoff or falloff of voter
participation is common in state issue elections"); MAGLEBY, supra note 15, at 100 ("Data on the levels
of voter participation in elections having statewide propositions show that on average 15-18 percent of
those who turn out do not vote on statewide propositions."); id. at 83-95 (reporting that on occasion as
many as 25% of voters who come to the polls do not vote on ballot propositions). But see DBI, supra note
92, at 185 (suggesting that "voter fatigue and voter dropoff are not significant problems in California" and
that "the extent of initiative drop-off is minimal-comparable to voter drop-off for such statewide offices
as lieutenant Governor and secretary of state").
121. Lupia, supra note 118, at 391.
122. Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California
Insurance Reform Elections, 88 AlI. POL. Sci. REv. 63, 63 (1994). Even ballot pamphlets often require an
investment of time and effort over and above what many voters are prepared to make. Id. at 65 ("The fact
that voters could obtain a great deal of information from the California Ballot Pamphlet is not in question.
However, whether voters might reasonably be expected to spend the time and effort required to learn from
the pamphlet is questionable and undermines its potential effectiveness.").
123. DBI, supra note 92, at 198. The mass media are not the only source for such shortcuts. See, e.g.,
Huckfeldt & Beck, supra note 100, at 271 ("[T]he citizen is embedded in an intermediation environment
combining personal discussion networks, mass media, and secondary organizations .... ); see also supra
notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
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by some "elites" and, to a lesser extent, by the press. 124 One study in
California, for example, analyzed a proposed insurance reform initiative and
suggested that many voters were strongly influenced by the positions of
consumer groups, Ralph Nader, insurance companies, trial lawyers, and
others.1"s The impact of newspaper endorsements is less clear and appears
to be more contextual, but one comprehensive California study of newspaper
endorsements found that "a substantial editorial impact on vote choice had
occurred."
126
Voter reliance upon the cues and proxies communicated through media
sources is likely to be especially strong where the ballot questions are lengthy
or complicated because that is where the information costs associated with the
voting decision are highest. And there is some evidence of a trajectory toward
longer and more complex initiatives. During the 1988 and 1990 elections, for
example, Californians voted on thirteen initiatives that exceeded 5000 words
(approximately twenty double-spaced, typewritten pages), including one
proposal of 15,633 words (approximately sixty-two double-spaced, typewritten
pages).
127
Consider an example of complex ballot propositions in which it is
reasonable to suppose that media and advertising helped to shape public
attitudes about the interpretive questions that confronted the court. In
Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Political Practices
Commission"28 and Gerken v. Fair Political Practices Commission,2 9 the
California Supreme Court struggled with dual campaign finance reform
initiatives that passed on the same ballot. The issue there was whether one or
both measures would take effect, which depended under the state constitution
upon whether the two measures conflicted. If they did, then only the one
receiving the greater percentage of votes would go into effect. Proposition 73,
which secured a fifty-eight percent affirmative vote, limited campaign
contributions and mass mailings and prohibited public funding of elections for
all state and local elective offices. Proposition 68, which secured a fifty-four
percent affirmative vote, limited campaign expenditures and provided for state
matching of campaign funds for state legislative races only. The court found
124. MAGLEBY, supra note 15, at 155-59; see DBI, supra note 92, at 212-13; Lupia, supra note 118,
at 397. Lupia's study found that voter knowledge about the position of affected industry or interest groups
served as an efficient cue and allowed "relatively uninformed voters... to use their limited resources
efficiently while influencing electoral outcomes in ways that they would have if they had taken the time
and effort necessary to acquire encyclopedic information." Lupia, supra note 122, at 72. These
endorsements mimic the party and candidate cues used in candidate elections, but they are more diluted.
125. See DBI, supra note 92, at 215 (reporting field poll from May and July 1988). Lupia's study
reached a similar conclusion. See Lupia, supra note 122, at 72.
126. DBI, supra note 92, at 212.
127. Id. at 85. The daunting excess of such measures makes voters understandably "hard-pressed to
understand them." Id.
128. 799 P.2d 1220 (Cal. 1990).
129. 863 P.2d 694 (Cal. 1993).
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that the two conflicted so that only Proposition 73 could take effect. 13 Even
after large portions of Proposition 73 were ruled unconstitutional in separate
federal litigation, the California court ruled that Proposition 68 could not take
effect because the surviving portions of Proposition 73 were separate, distinct,
and thus severable from the remainder of the statute.13'
What was the "intent" of the concurrent majorities that passed these
measures? Was it to enact both, to the extent that portions of both could be
harmonized? Was it to ensure that one or the other passed? Was it to express
a preference for one over the other? In all likelihood, the question is
unanswerable. But surely a court would be hard pressed even to approach that
question intelligently without considering what the research suggests would be
the most important evidence: how the competing measures were framed,
characterized, and represented in the media and advertising, particularly in
relation to one another. In Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending and Gerken,
the court celebrated its fealty to the voters yet failed to look at the information
likely to have most powerfully shaped how voters understood these two
measures.
Without closely analyzing the media sources that judges so persistently
ignored in the decisions studied-a task I have not undertaken-it is premature
to say that, had courts consulted media or advertising sources, they would
necessarily have reached different interpretive results. But it is reasonable to
suppose that results might have changed in some cases.'32 The study does
130. See 799 P.2d at 1236-37.
131. See 863 P.2d at 698.
132. A case drawn from outside the study nicely illustrates how the refusal to consider media sources
can affect results and contains a dissenting opinion that-rare among cases in this area-directly confronts
the relevance of media sources to judicial interpretation. In Bishop v. Linkway Stores, 655 S.W.2d 426
(Ark. 1983), the Arkansas Supreme Court construed an anti-usury constitutional amendment enacted by the
voters through a referendum. The amendment limited the "maximum lawful rate of interest on any contract"
to 5% above the Federal Reserve Discount Rate. Id. at 428.
The amendment also made void "[a]ll contracts for consumer loans and credit sales having a greater
rate of interest than seventeen percent." IL The plaintiff bought furniture on credit and was charged a 15%
interest rate, which he argued was usurious because the amendment capped interest rates at 13.5% at that
time. The question was whether the separate 17% limitation on consumer loans created a 17% ceiling on
any consumer loan or, as the plaintiff argued, meant that the limit on consumer loans was the "lesser of
17 percent or 5 percent over the Federal Reserve Discount Rate.' Id. at 429. The majority chose the latter
reading, interpreting the statute to impose a "two-fold limitation on the maximum amount of interest a
lender can charge on a consumer loan or credit sale." Id. In so doing, the majority claimed the mantle of
plain meaning, arguing that "where the meaning of an act or constitutional amendment is clear and
unambiguous, this Court is primarily concerned with what the document says, rather than what its drafters
may have intended." Id. at 428-29. The dissent, by contrast, complained that the majority had failed to
consider the "history of the times and voters' intent." Id. at 429 (Hatfield, J., dissenting). The dissent went
on to state:
Newspaper articles and media broadcasts, considered hearsay under Rule 801, Rules of
Evidence, can be admitted as an exception under Rule 803(24), Rules of Evidence, since they
are relevant and can be tested by other evidence and opposing counsel's examination. Such
articles are vitally important here to show the "history of the times" and what was
communicated to the voters concerning Amendment 60. Important in this regard and a further
reason for admission is that the record reflects that only one interpretation was placed on the
effect of Amendment 60 as to consumer rates, i.e., that they would be no more than 17%. No
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point, for example, to circumstances and configurations in which the exclusive
use of formal interpretive sources is most likely to be unreliable when
measured against a stated goal of effectuating the will of the electorate. For
example, the gap between judicially imposed and popularly understood
meaning can be substantial when courts give statutory language a technical or
stylized legal meaning in the face of a contrary, common understanding likely
to have been reiterated and reified by media representations. 133 Similarly,
when courts address a highly obscure legal question that implicates laws other
than the initiative, exclusive reliance on formal legal sources may cause a court
to resolve the question in a way that is inconsistent with the broad
characterizations of the initiative that were likely to dominate media and
advertising representations.'3 Results aside, it is unseemly for courts to pay
such conspicuous homage to popular prerogative while ignoring the sources of
information so central to the populace.
contrary evidence appeared in the record. Surely this is relevant in interpreting voter intent in
approving Amendment 60.
Id. at 432 (Hatfield, J., dissenting). From the perspective of the dissenting justices, thus, the outcome of
the case should have been dictated by what they regarded as the singular and clear understanding about the
interest rate on consumer loans that was communicated to voters by newspapers and broadcast media.
133. For example, in Backman v. United States, 516 A.2d 923 (D.C. 1986), the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals construed the term "narcotic" in the Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Initiative of 1981.
Under the terms of the initiative, certain offenses involving a "narcotic drug" triggered mandatory minimum
sentences, except that a court could exempt a first-time offender from the sentencing provisions if the
defendant "was (1) an 'addict' at the time of the violation and (2) committed the offense 'for the primary
purpose of obtaining a narcotic drug which he [or she] required for his [or her] personal use because of
his [or her] addiction to such drug."' Id. at 925 (alterations in original) (quoting D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-
541(c)(2) (Supp. 1986)). In Backman, the defendant was convicted for possession with intent to distribute
heroin but sought a waiver from the sentencing requirement arguing that his actions were undertaken to
support his cocaine habit. Looking to a separate ordinance passed by the City Council that defined
"narcotic" to exclude cocaine, the court ruled the defendant ineligible for the exemption (and the mandatory
minimum sentence) because cocaine was not a "narcotic." Id. at 926. In doing so, the court said that it was
obliged to "assume that the District voters relied on the statutory definition of 'narcotic' in [the separate
city council ordinance]"-and not, for example, on Webster's Dictionary, which the court acknowledged
did define cocaine as a narcotic. Id. at 926 & n.4. This is an instance in which it is likely that media
representations focusing simply on "drugs" would have supported a popular understanding of the initiative
at odds with the view ultimately taken by the court.
134. For example, Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Gillespie, 785 P.2d 500 (Cal. 1990), involved
Proposition 103, an initiative that enacted "mandatory renewal" rules that sharply restricted the grounds
upon which insurance companies could cancel automobile policies. The issue in the case was whether
insurers could cancel policies without meeting any of the statutory grounds if they intended to withdraw
from the California market. The initiative did not specifically address this question. Securing approval to
withdraw was neither guaranteed, nor necessarily expeditious, under California law. Nevertheless, the court
ruled that insurers could cancel policies simply upon filing their request to withdraw. In doing so, the
majority relied heavily upon some obscure language in the initiative that addressed a related issue about
withdrawal, as well as upon its analysis of the separate legislative law governing insurance company
withdrawal from the state. Proposition 103, however, was apparently widely billed as a measure to rein in
insurance company discretion so as to make insurance "'fair, available, and affordable."' Id. at 516
(Broussard, J., dissenting) (quoting Proposition 103). This is thus an instance in which the broad rhetoric
attached to the initiative might well have suggested to voters a different result on the question of whether
insurers were free to ignore the statutory restrictions on cancellation once they decided to initiate
proceedings to leave the state.
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2. Voters and Formal Interpretive Sources
Against this background of media-dominated initiative campaigns stands
a starkly divergent set of judicial practices-practices that reflect the tenacious
hold of traditional legal method on courts.1
35
a. Statutory Language
Echoing traditional statutory interpretation, courts treat the language of the
initiative as the most important interpretive source. Notwithstanding its
centrality to courts, however, it is doubtful that a majority of the electorate
even reads the text of ballot propositions. The comprehensive study of the
California initiative process performed by the California Commission on
Campaign Financing concluded flatly that "[v]ery few people actually read
initiative texts, and their legalese constitutes an intimidating part of the [ballot]
pamphlet."' 136 A separate study by the California Policy Seminar reported a
voter survey reflecting that less than seventeen percent of voters said that they
"'usually' read the legal text.' ' 137
Indeed, because voters widely regard the language of ballot measures to
be impenetrable, both of these studies seriously entertained the idea of purging
the actual statutory language from the ballot pamphlet distributed to voters.
The California Policy Seminar concluded that "[c]onsideration should be given
to removing the legal text altogether.' ' 138 The California Commission,
although declining to propose that reform, endorsed the 1990 move by the
Secretary of State requiring that ballot texts be moved to the back of the
pamphlet as a way to minimize the mischief ascribed to them. 39 In their
search for popular intent, courts are thus privileging precisely the material that
observers of the initiative process consider irrelevant at best, and menacing at
worst, to most voters.
Moreover, even if more voters did read the ballot measures in full, there
is evidence that an alarmingly high percentage would find the language
difficult to comprehend. 40 The most exhaustive "readability" study of ballot
135. It may be that this tenacious hold is rooted in the way the courts studied here understand the
demands of the traditional rule of law. See infra text accompanying notes 184-87.
136. DBI, supra note 92, at 261.
137. DuBois & FEENEY, supra note 24, at 136 (quoting Philip Dubois et al., The California Ballot
Pamphlet: A Survey of Voters: A Preliminary Report Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of State 7
(March 1991) (unpublished manuscript for California Policy Seminar, on file with author)); cf. MAGLEBY,
supra note 15, at 140 ("Because ballot propositions often deal with complex issues, it is important to
differentiate between the voters' knowledge about the broad issue involved and their knowledge about the
proposition itself.").
138. DuBois & FEENEY, supra note 24, at 135. For the California Commission's discussion, see DBI,
supra note 92, at 261-62.
139. See DBI, supra note 92, at 254.
140. Many studies conclude that the language of ballot measures is frequently confusing to voters. See
id. at 87; CRONIN, supra note 15, at 208-09; DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 24, at 96-124; MAGLEBY,
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questions concluded that ballot language typically requires a reading
comprehension level that far exceeds that held by the vast majority of a state's
population. David Magleby studied the ballot language in four
states-California, Massachusetts, Oregon, and Rhode Island-for the years
1970-79. Using complex formulae, he found that, in order to comprehend
ballot descriptions, a voter in California or Oregon would have needed to read
at the sixteenth to eighteenth grade level (bachelor's degree plus two years);
in Massachusetts or Rhode Island, a voter would have needed to read at the
fourteenth to fifteenth grade level (second to third year of college). 141 In
terms of formal schooling, less than twenty percent of the adults in any of
these states could have been expected to have these levels of education.
142
A separate study of Arizona, Colorado, Oregon, and Washington reported by
Thomas Cronin revealed that between fifty-two and seventy-four percent of
voters admitted confusion about the policy choice presented by their state's
ballot measures. 143 Cronin identified "drafting confusion" as a major source
of voter confusion. 44
The problems undermining the use of ballot language can only be
exacerbated by the trend toward ever-lengthening measures and the increasing
use of technical legal terms in initiative laws. As discussed earlier, terms like
"joint and several liability" in a tort reform initiative, "declarant" in a criminal
procedure initiative that altered the hearsay rule, and "right of contribution" in
an environmental initiative are unlikely to be familiar to many voters.' 45 By
according the greatest interpretive weight to the words used in initiatives,
courts not only elevate the importance of a source widely ignored by voters,
but they favor a source that is accessible only to a select subgroup of voters.
b. Formal Legal Texts
There is nothing in the research about voter behavior to support the
dubious notion that voters are familiar with the legal texts that courts invoke
so frequently as part of their asserted search for popular intent. Nevertheless,
courts use these legal texts-previous judicial interpretations of the contested
term; the meaning of the same or similar terms used in a different statute; the
prior law or legislation that the initiative replaced; or canons of construction
against which legislatures are presumed to draft legislation-more than any
supra note 15, at 118-19. This confusion, in fact, has led all states that permit the statutory initiative to
require that some form of explanatory ballot material be provided to the voters. DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra
note 24, at 125-33.
141. See MAGLEBY, supra note 15, at 118-19.
142. Id. at 119. There have been some readability reforms since Magleby published his book. See DBI,
supra note 92, at 240.
143. See CRONIN, supra note 15, at 74.
144. See id. at 208-09.
145. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
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other category except the statutory language itself. In deploying these sources,
courts impute to voters, expressly or by implication, sophisticated knowledge
of the legal background against which an initiative law is drafted.
146
Some of the legal knowledge imputed to voters by decisions in the study
is strikingly implausible. In People v. Skinner,47 for example, the electorate
passed a law reforming criminal procedure, including the insanity defense. The
terms of the initiative required a defendant asserting the insanity defense to
prove both (1) a failure to understand the consequences of the criminal act and
(2) an inability to appreciate the difference between right and wrong.1 41 The
court held, however, that the voters' intent was to restore to California the
"M'naghten test," which would require a defendant to show one element or the
other, but not both. In order to impose that reading, the court not only
disregarded a notation in the ballot pamphlet stating that the change "'could
increase the difficulty of proving that a person is not guilty by reason of
insanity,' "1 49 but also read the "and" in the statute as an "or."' 50
Similarly implausible assumptions of voter sophistication concerning the
state of the law and legal doctrine appear in other decisions in the study, such
as those attributing to the voters knowledge of the rules regarding multiple
hearsay,'5 1 the presumption of statutory prospectivity,152  and the
relationship between an initiative mandating provision of certain services in
connection with domestic violence and a prior legislative law on the
subject.
53
c. Official Ballot Pamphlets
Official ballot pamphlets are used in a minority of jurisdictions."
Where pamphlets are distributed, they pose many of the same problems-albeit
ones not as severe-as statutory language. This is an ironic state of affairs, for
the widely acknowledged impenetrability of statutory language is a principal
reason that many states require the government to provide more readily
understandable explanations of ballot measures to voters. Particularly in states
requiring provision of a ballot pamphlet to registered voters, 55 the purpose
146. Courts sometimes take this stance explicitly. In one case in the study, the court noted that "[w]e
must hold the legislature and the citizenry to the same standards when interpreting the laws they enact."
Backman v. United States, 516 A.2d 923, 926 (D.C. 1986).
147. 704 P.2d 752 (Cal. 1985).
148. Id. at 753.
149. Id. at 758 (quoting ballot pamphlet).
150. Id. at 759.
151. See Whitman v. Superior Court, 820 P.2d 262, 267 (Cal. 1991).
152. See Tapia v. Superior Court, 807 P.2d 434, 441 (Cal. 1991).
153. See City of Tacoma v. State, 816 P.2d 7, 10-11 (Wash. 1991).
154. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
155. See DUBOIS & FEENEy, supra note 24, at 127-33 (surveying pamphlets required under each
state's law).
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is to communicate what is at issue and to explain it to voters in a reasonably
clear, succinct fashion. Yet the goals that ballot pamphlets are designed to
further appear to remain substantially unfulfilled.
The sheer length of the pamphlet can undermine its goals. In California,
for example, the 1990 pamphlet was 224 pages long.'56 Moreover, in several
states, proponents and opponents of the measure are asked to draft the
arguments for and against the measure that form the centerpiece of the ballot
pamphlet. 57 These authors will have every incentive to characterize the
measure in partisan, politically driven ways, rather than to attempt any
detached, impartial summary. 58 Summaries or arguments of this sort can
mislead-and are sometimes designed to mislead-voters about the effects and
potential consequences of the vote. Consider, for example, the two competing
campaign finance reform initiatives that were enacted in California. In the
ballot arguments, proponents of one measure characterized the other as a
"'TRICK DESIGNED TO DEFEAT THE REAL CAMPAIGN REFORM
CONTAINED IN [THIS PROPOSITION] ... .,,,159 To the extent that ballot
arguments reflect this kind of partisanship, they may-inadvertently-provide
courts with a glimpse of the themes that were used in advertising, but they
cannot be uncontroversially regarded as repositories of dispassionate analysis
and information.
1 60
Independent of problems of length and partisanship, there are substantial
questions about the usage and value of ballot pamphlets. Ballot pamphlets
clearly command more readers than does statutory language. However,
estimates of the extent to which voters read these pamphlets vary greatly. Both
Magleby and the recent California Policy Seminar study concluded that most
voters do not use ballot pamphlets.161 Some studies are more optimistic,
placing the percentage between thirty percent and sixty percent of those who
156. Magleby, supra note 1, at 33.
157. DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 24, at 126-33.
158. Cf. Lowenstein, supra note 89, at 954 & n.73 (stating that ballot pamphlets are "drafted for
tactical reasons," and therefore may not "reflect the intent of... the greater number of persons who vote
for [the initiatives described by them]").
159. Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 799 P.2d 1220, 1226
(Cal. 1990) (quoting ballot materials).
160. In a case drawn from outside the study, one court candidly acknowledged this problem:
Ballot arguments often embody the sound-bite rhetoric of competing political interests vying
for popular support. However useful they may be in identifying the general evils sought to be
remedied by an initiative measure, they are principally designed to win votes, not to present a
thoughtful or precise explication of legal tests or standards.
Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633, 646 n.5 (Cal. 1994).
161. MAGLEBY, supra note 15, at 136; see also DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 24, at 133 ("Although
some jurisdictions report heavy voter reliance on the pamphlet, as a general rule only a minority of voters
actually read it, even when it is sent to them through the mail." (footnote omitted)).
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vote. 62 In either event, it would appear that some substantial percentage of
voters do not read the material.1
63
Second, the distribution of voters who read and do not read ballot
pamphlets does not appear to be random. Echoing the findings concerning
statutory language, several studies suggest a demographic skew, with more
highly educated and more affluent voters reading the ballot material at the
highest rates.' 64 This is not surprising, given lingering readability problems
with pamphlets. Even though state laws requiring pamphlets have generally
been part of an effort to make ballot questions more comprehensible and
accessible to voters,165 the results have been mixed.
The 1992 California Commission report concluded that pamphlets are still
full of what many regard as "'legalistic gobbledygook.' ' 1 66 For example,
applying standard readability formulae to two 1990 measures revealed that a
voter would need three to four years of college to read at the level required for
comprehension. 67 Moreover, given the unfamiliarity of many voters with
legal jargon and doctrines, 16 even those voters who possess the level of
education required to read the pamphlet may well be unable to form the sort
of "intent" that the courts' interpretive approach assumes.
The overrepresentation of elite, better-educated voters among users of
ballot pamphlets also highlights a related, but larger, problem with popular
intent: Courts draw conclusions about the will of the populace, writ large,
based on the very small number of voters who participate in ballot elections.
Eugene Lee concludes that "[a]mong those who vote, those from upper
162. DBI, supra note 92, at 244 ("Most surveys indicate that somewhere between 30% and 60% of
voters rely on the booklets for information .... "); see CRONIN, supra note 15, at 81-82 (reporting study
of 1976 election in which 75% of voters surveyed stated that they had made some use of pamphlet).
163. On occasion, questions are raised about whether voters even received, or had access to, the
pamphlet. See, e.g., Robert A. Jordan, Voters Can Win in Ballot Battle, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 3, 1994, at
13 (describing legal challenge to several initiatives based on failure to print ballot summaries directly on
ballot and noting that some plaintiffs claimed that they had not received pamphlet before voting). In a
decision stemming from this challenge, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the state
constitution permits election authorities to provide required ballot summaries to voters on a separate sheet
of paper when it is not feasible to print the summary on the ballot. Tobias v. Secretary of the
Commonwealth, 646 N.E.2d 1054, 1060 (Mass. 1995). The court did not address, however, whether some
voters had not received the sheet, as the plaintiffs argued. Id. at 1056.
164. See DBI, supra note 92, at 247 ('The propensity of those with little formal schooling not to read
the voters' pamphlet is compounded by the complexity of the booklet itself."); id. at 248 (51,000 voters
responding to survey in back of 1990 ballot pamphlet reflected a similar demographic skew: 28% had a
college degree; 90% had some college; 92% usually voted in both primary and general elections; 95%-i+
voted on "most or all" ballot propositions); MAGLEBY, supra note 15, at 137 (44% of those with advanced
degrees gleaned information from election handbook whereas only 7% of those with less than eighth-grade
education did so); cf. CRONIN, supra note 15, at 82 (suggesting that as many as 15% to 20% of Americans
cannot read or have "very low reading ability").
165. For example, California mandates comprehensibility to the average voter, Oregon's secretary of
state decides if the materials are sufficiently clear, and Oklahoma requires comprehensibility for an eighth
grader. DBI, supra note 92, at 238 & n.37.
166. Id. at 239 (quoting television editorial).
167. Id. at 241.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 146-53.
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socioeconomic categories are disproportionately represented among those who
decide referendums. Most specifically, education has a strong impact on the
likelihood of voting on propositions. ,1 69 Low turnout is, of course, a well-
known problem in the context of candidate elections and raises similar
questions in that setting. 70 Data indicating that many voters who come to the
polls and vote for a candidate do not vote on ballot measures,17 1 however,
suggest that this problem has added dimensions where direct legislation is
involved.
3. The Unbridgeable Gap?
The discussion above might suggest an obvious incremental solution: Ask
courts to invert the interpretive hierarchy and assign meaning to direct
legislation based on the same informal sources that voters so heavily use in
learning about initiatives. The idea would be to reform the doctrine of popular
intent to give judges a more reliable picture of the voters' will.
Bringing media sources into the interpretive canon would be at once quite
radical (in taking judges out of familiar and conventional interpretive terrain)
and quite modest (in retaining the normative centrality of intent-based
interpretation). 172 Asking judges to wade into the domain of media coverage
and advertising in search of a singular and dispositive popular intent, however,
imagines a judicial task that is onerous and-more significantly-ultimately
incoherent. This task seems doomed to fail when measured against the goal of
enabling judges to locate a single popular intent. Judicial immersion in the
unwieldy body of images, words, and political slogans that may comprise the
media coverage and advertising related to a ballot measure is likely to
intensify, not reduce, the problems of indeterminacy that already undermine the
search for popular intent. Particularly in a high-profile campaign, the mass of
169. Eugene C. Lee, The American Experience, 1778-1978, in THE REFERENDUM DEVICE 46, 55
(Austin Ranney ed., 1981). Magleby notes that:
Citizens with lower socioeconomic status not only are less likely to come to the polls but also
are less likely to vote on many statewide propositions if they do come. Citizens at the other end
of the socioeconomic ladder enjoy a double advantage: they are both more likely to turn out to
vote and more likely to register a preference on the proposition.
MAGLEBY, supra note 15, at 108-10.
170. See, e.g., FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, WHY AMERICANS DON'T VOTE 4
(1988) (noting low turnout and suggesting that "the active American electorate overrepresents those who
have more, and underrepresents those who have less"); The Disappearing American Voter, 24 NAT'L J.
2747 (1992) (reviewing RUY A. TELXEHRA, THE DISAPPEARING AmCAN VOTER (1992)) (noting overall
decline in voter turnout since 1960).
171. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
172. Indeed, McNellie, who supports the use of ballot pamphlets, exit polls, and media sources in
interpreting direct legislation, argues that this approach adapts the traditional model of statutory construction
to the interpretation of popularly enacted initiatives. McNellie, supra note 7, at 172-73. McNellie's
argument, however, vastly understates the problems associated with using these sources and, conversely,
overstates the potential determinacy of initiatives and the capacity of courts to discover a singular
"objective intent" underlying a popular or legislative law. See id. at 171.
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media representations is sprawling and diffuse, and it will rarely yield
definitive answers about the design of the voters. Consider, for example, the
contemporary phenomenon of talk radio. What could we ask judges to distill
from such apparently influential, but cacophonous, sources?
173
In some cases, there will be information in media sources that is relevant
to the interpretive issues before the court. When reasonably accessible, direct,
and uncontroverted in addressing the question at issue,174 there are good
reasons for courts to consider such information along with other relevant
factors. 75 It is quite another thing, however, to suppose that consulting
media sources will enable judges to locate a fixed, retrievable popular intent.
It is unlikely that intent-based interpretation can find its deliverance by
recasting judges as cultural critics or political consultants and asking them to
determine which stories, symbols, or sound bites most likely influenced voters
and shaped a discrete collective understanding.
In addition, assigning a central place to media sources invites strategic
behavior on the part of partisans in the initiative battle, such as attempts to fill
the airwaves and the larger public record with characterizations and claims
intended to influence subsequent judicial interpretation. 176 In the end, this
solution would create as many problems as it would solve.
A second incremental improvement to intentionalist methodology that
might address the gap between judicial and voter practices would be to expand
and improve the ballot pamphlet in a way that increases its utility as an
interpretive resource. If the quality of the ballot pamphlet were improved, and
the range of information in it expanded, it might serve as a bridge of sorts
between judges and voters by giving courts a finite, accessible interpretive
resource that had actually been consulted in relevant ways by a significant
portion of the electorate.
This approach has serious shortcomings of its own. First, as discussed
above, even though all voters have the opportunity to use the ballot pamphlet,
elites tend to use it more than others. Without significantly broadening the
segment of voters who use the pamphlet, choosing a rule that
disproportionately weights its contents would exacerbate this demographic
skew. At the same time, enhancing the role of the ballot pamphlet as an
interpretive resource for courts would likely subvert efforts to make the
pamphlet more accessible to more voters. In fact, the goal of making the
173. See Mike Hoyt, Talk Radio: Turning up the Volume, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Nov.-Dec.
1992, at 44 (noting range of topics discussed and voices heard on talk radio).
174. See Bishop v. Linkway Stores, 655 S.W2d 426, 431-32 (Ark. 1983) (Hatfield, J., dissenting)
(advocating consideration of media sources); see also supra note 132 (describing majority and dissenting
opinions' approach to interpretation of popularly enacted constitutional amendment).
175. See infra Section V.C for a discussion of what some of these factors should be.
176. Cf. Joan Biskupic, Scalia Takes a Narrow View in Seeking Congress' Will, CONG. Q., Mar. 24,
1990, at 913, 917-18 (discussing whether legislators, with aid of lobbyists, manipulate legislative history
to try to influence judicial interpretation).
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pamphlet more useful to voters is in stark tension with the goal of maximizing
the pamphlet as an interpretive resource and redressing some of the problems
described here. Loading up the ballot pamphlet with extended verbiage
designed to spell out potential consequences, to explicate the legal context
surrounding a proposed initiative, and to particularize the "intent" of a measure
is likely to make the pamphlet less useful to voters trying to arrive at a
position on the basic policy question at issue. The suggestions of recent
initiative reform studies, for example, point precisely in the opposite direction;
they focus on streamlining and simplifying the pamphlet to make it more
accessible to large numbers of voters.
177
In addition, like the notion of bringing media sources into the interpretive
canon, this approach would create incentives for strategic behavior on the part
of partisans. Where proponents and opponents write the "for and against"
arguments that must be included in the pamphlet, heightening the interpretive
weight of pamphlets might well invite partisans to draft these sections with a
view to creating a desired "intent" for purposes of future interpretive
litigation. 178
A third incremental improvement to intentionalism might be to relocate the
inquiry from specific intent to a more general, abstract level. Some of the
decisions studied, for example, try to finesse the problems with popular intent
by searching out the overarching purpose of the law and choosing an
interpretation regarded as consistent with that purpose. This is a familiar move
in statutory construction, reflecting the enduring influence of the "legal
process" school's purpose-based approach to interpretation.
179
Relying on an asserted statutory purpose is attractive from the standpoint
of more realistically reflecting what initiative laws frequently are: a general
policy approved by a majority of voters. And that policy is a relevant
consideration for interpretation. But within the context of the direct lawmaking
process, the notion of purpose is problematic in its own right. First, as is
frequently the case in the legislative arena, the purpose inquiry is wholly
circular when the very question at issue is what purpose the voters had in
passing a law. Shifting the inquiry to purpose does not solve so much as
restate the basic problem by shifting the indeterminacy to a higher level of
abstraction.18 Second, purpose can be a crude and undifferentiated measure
177. DBI, supra note 92, at 260-62; DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 24, at 169-70.
178. See Kelso, supra note 7, at 358 (arguing that California courts should give ballot pamphlet "little
or even no weight in the interpretive process" because it contains material written by biased advocates).
179. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1377-80 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
180. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 58, at 1544-45. California's pair of campaign finance "counter-
initiatives," see supra text accompanying notes 128-31, illustrate how an initiative's purpose can itself be
hotly contested. After the two initiatives passed on the same ballot, it fell to the California Supreme Court
to determine whether one or both would take effect. See Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair
Political Practices Comm'n, 799 P.2d 1220, 1221 (Cal. 1990) (holding measure that received fewer votes
to be inoperative). The court reconsidered the issue after portions of one of the initiatives were declared
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that provides no real limits at all. To the extent that purpose tries to recreate
what the intent "would have been" had voters foreseen the interpretive
problem, the acontextuality of those problems from the voters' perspective
suggests that voters would not have been situated to analyze the issue closely
even had they known of it. Moreover, judicial reliance upon "popular
purpose," like reliance on popular intent, can also render the initiative process
vulnerable to manipulation by initiative proponents and drafters. If courts
construe all ambiguities to be consistent with the initiative's broad purpose,
then drafters will have every incentive to make ballot measures not only
strategically ambiguous, but long, complex and full of obscure, yet legally
potent, provisions. Many voters will not read or readily comprehend these
provisions, but that fact will be largely irrelevant if purpose is the interpretive
benchmark.
In sum, the gap between judicial and voter practices seems
enduring-perhaps inevitable. I turn in the next part to the larger significance
of this gap and to possible alternative interpretive methodologies.
V. BEYOND POPULAR INTENT
A. The Dilemma of Clashing Conceptions of Law
As the preceding parts reflect, the idea of popular intent is riddled with
problems that are formidable at the level of interpretive doctrine. But the
problems run deeper than interpretive doctrine alone. In this part, I suggest a
broader conceptual framework within which to analyze these problems and to
assess possible responses to them.
A central point suggested by this study is a radical rupture between two
conceptions of law. Law, on the one hand, is seen by the courts here in highly
positivist, material terms. According to this positivist conception, the law
principally consists of the statutory text and what is reflected in other formal
legal sources, such as related statutes, judicial opinions, and canons of
construction. The farthest this conception extends is to include ballot material,
which is mandated by and prepared in accordance with state law, reduced to
an identifiable text, and reminiscent of traditional legislative history.
Contrast a second, popular conception of law-law as it is seen from the
perspective of the voters in an initiative campaign. This conception is far more
fluid and diffuse, for law here is constructed only minimally by its text or
other formal legal sources. The words of the law are but a starting point for
the larger, more complex, and sprawling social process of generating legal
unconstitutional and came to the same conclusion. See Gerken v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 863 P.2d
694 (Cal. 1993). Central to the court's inquiry was whether the two measures could be reconciled, which
turned significantly on the purpose of each measure. Id. at 699. In an instance like this one, resort to
purpose cannot itself resolve the issue.
1995]
The Yale Law Journal
meanings. In the context of initiative laws, the mass media form a central,
indeed constitutive, part of this larger organization and production of meaning.
Mass advertising, television images, newspaper reporting and editorializing,
and-increasingly-talk radio occupy the center stage where lawyers are
accustomed to seeing law books and doctrines. To borrow from Murray
Edelman, a principal theorist of the symbolic uses of politics,"'1 political
language and images created and proliferated by the mass media powerfully
shape the legal reality experienced by the voters2--voters whose will the
court purports to privilege. Viewed in these terms, the "law" is not neatly
distinguishable from the unbounded body of ideas, images, and symbols that
dominate the political processes that generate laws.
18 3
The positivist and popular conceptions of law may each be seen to
correspond to important elements of the traditional rule of law."8 The
positivist conception, with its emphasis on the written legal word, echoes the
importance of notice and identifiable, knowable legal commands. 85 The
courts studied here may so consistently confine themselves to formal legal
sources because they understand the rule of law to impose that limitation. The
popular conception, however, may also be linked to a principle emphasized by
the traditional rule of law-the insistence upon a "constrained judicial role,"
thought to be "required for democracy, a core substantive value."' 86
Privileging the perspective of the voters-those entrusted to make the
law---can be understood to honor the separation of powers and to protect the
electorate's prerogatives.1
87
Judicial interpretation of initiative laws stands at a prime point of tension
between the positivist and popular conceptions of law: Judges say they must
honor the popular will, yet they are constrained by the formal boundaries of
181. For his major works in this field, see EDELMAN, supra note 106; EDELMAN, supra note 85.
182. "[P]olitical language is political reality; there is no other so far as the meaning of events to actors
and spectators is concerned." EDELMAN, supra note 106, at 104.
183. For a discussion of the ways in which gay civil rights laws are assigned meanings along these
lines, see Schacter, supra note 72, at 295-317.
184. For explorations of the elements and problems of the traditional rule of law, see Martha Minow,
Partial Justice: Law and Minorities, in THE FATE OF LAW 15, 36-40 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kears
eds., 1991); Francis J. Mootz I, Rethinking the Rule of Law: A Demonstration that the Obvious is
Plausible, 61 TENN. L. REv. 69 (1993); Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L.
REV. 781 (1989).
185. Mootz, supra note 184, at 71 & n.2 (discussing rule of law as seen by Friedrich von Hayek and
quoting Hayek's assertion "'that government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced
beforehand-rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its
coercive powers in given circumstances"' (quoting FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 54
(1944))); Radin, supra note 184, at 785-86 (exploring notion that "there must be rules" and "rules must
be capable of being followed," and insistence upon "'know-ability"' and "'perform-ability"' of legal rules).
186. Radin, supra note 184, at 790.
187. In the ways they reflect values linked to the traditional rule of law, the positivist and popular
conceptions of law may be associated, respectively, with the "instrumentalist" and "substantive" accounts
of the rule of law suggested by Professor Margaret Jane Radin. See id. at 791 ("Mhe central precepts of
the Rule of Law can be defended either instrumentally, as necessary to make a legal system work to
structure behavior, or substantively, as necessary to fairness, human dignity, freedom and democracy.").
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law from venturing into exactly the sources that most powerfully create the
electorate's understanding of popular law. There is, in other words, a jarring
clash between the formal legal culture and the popular, political culture.
Although this culture clash is not confined to the domain of direct
legislation, 188 it is sharply visible there. And the challenge of reconciling-or
at least accommodating-these disparate, colliding forces is an important part
of what makes the interpretive dilemmas in direct democracy so difficult.
Interpretive rules cannot resolve the problematic disjunction between these
competing conceptions of law, but interpretive practices should, at least, be
shaped in light of this disjunction. As I explore potential responses to the
problems of popular intent, I consider how they address these clashing
conceptions of law.
B. The Failure of Formalist Responses
I have already suggested that one formalist response-incremental
improvement in intent-based interpretation-is inadequate. The idea of asking
judges to locate popular intent based on information from media and
advertising substantially embraces the popular conception of law, but, as I have
argued, it underestimates the difficulties raised by that conception. I turn now
to two other responses that may be seen in the formalist tradition-strong
textualism and what I call "rhetorical formalism."
1. The Strong Textualist Response: Forsaking Intentionalism?
One formalist response to problems of popular intent would be to jettison
intent entirely and to redirect the interpretive search toward the "ordinary" or
"plain" meaning of the statutory terms. This approach would replicate in the
area of direct legislation what many contemporary textualists have advocated
in the context of legislative interpretation.!89 By "strong textualism," I refer
to an approach that takes seriously the notion that plain statutory meanings
exist, as opposed to one that imposes exacting, text-based rules of construction
as a way to narrow what are perceived to be the pathologies of the legislative
process and the statutory products it generates."
188. See infra Part VI for a discussion of the implications for the legislative process.
189. See generally Eskridge, supra note 45 (describing as "the new textualism" an approach that
focuses on statutory text and disfavors legislative history).
190. The clearest example of the latter textualist approach is the method recommended by Judge Frank
Easterbrook, who concedes that "[t]he 'plain meaning' rule is plainly ridiculous," but advocates text-based,
strict construction for reasons along these lines. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and the
Power of the Judiciary, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 87, 91 (1984). I have argued that Justice Scalia's
approach, though couched very much in terms of"strong textualism," can be understood along similar lines.
See Schacter, supra note 9, at 636-46.
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At a minimum, this approach would suffer from the same serious problem
that weakens it in the legislative context: the animating, yet often untenable,
idea that there is a single ordinary or plain meaning.191 As the interpretive
questions listed in Appendix B suggest, the decisions considered in this study
richly document this problem in the context of initiative laws. Thus, this
approach would merely replace the illusion of popular intent with the illusion
of plain meaning.
Moreover, the research suggesting that voters neither read, nor necessarily
comprehend, the language of initiatives means that it is especially problematic
in this context to make language the exclusive, or even primary, object of
judicial attention. Although textualism is frequently justified by its adherents
in terms of traditional notions of democratic theory and judicial restraint,"2
employing it in the context of direct legislation seems exactly at cross purposes
with the majoritarian ideas upon which textualism purports to rest. This is
especially so because the legal terms of art commonly used in ballot measures
are often meaningful only to a small, elite community of lawyers, judges, and
knowledgeable observers. Text-based interpretation of initiative statutes thus
cannot be persuasively justified based on claims of judicial restraint and
majority will. The social science work about voter behavior suggests that, quite
the contrary, privileging the source least relevant and accessible to voters can
only reduce their lawmaking powers and augment the cognate powers of
judges.
In the end, the textualist approach seems oblivious to-if not contemptuous
of-the idea of a popular conception of law. This uncritical embrace of an
extreme articulation of the positivist conception is thus problematic.
2. The Rhetorical Formalist Response: The Virtues of
the Judicial Wink?
Another way to respond to the problems I have identified is to suggest that
my critique fundamentally misconceives popular intent. Perhaps courts do not
really intend to locate and vindicate the voters' design after all and merely
deploy the vocabulary of popular intent to legitimate the value-laden yet
inevitable choices that judges must make. I have elsewhere called this idea
191. For critiques attacing as fallacy the purported objectivity of textualism, see Eskridge, supra note
45, at 666-84; Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing
Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 300-03 (1990);
Zeppos, supra note 58, at 1080-88. This critique of textualism can come from unlikely places, as Judge
Easterbrook's appraisal of the plain meaning rule reflects. See Easterbrook, supra note 190, at 87-92.
Indeed, even Justice Scalia, textualism's most avid contemporary defender, concedes the necessity to go
beyond statutory text and to consider statutory structure, context, and "'established canons of construction."'
Schacter, supra note 9, at 644 (discussing ways in which Justice Scalia's approach necessarily comes
unhinged from bare text of law) (quoting Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991)).
192. See Eskridge, supra note 45, at 649-56; Schacter, supra note 9, at 643-46.
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"rhetorical formalism"-the notion that the rhetoric of judicial restraint and
legislative supremacy, even if benignly insincere, figures importantly in the
drama of democratic legitimacy by reminding judges that they are not
legislators and by bolstering the acceptability of judicial results to the
public.'93 Unlike a "real" formalist defense of popular intent, which would
argue that judges can, in fact, locate a controlling popular intent or plain
statutory meaning, the rhetorical formalist would claim simply that it is better
for judges to say that they can do so-that is, to cloak in the garb of popular-
intent choices made based on the judge's sense of which of the competing
statutory interpretations is best.94
It is not at all difficult to conclude that judges who interpret initiatives
may invoke the rhetoric of popular intent for exactly this purpose. Indeed,
some of the opinions in this study concede that there are problems with
popular intent, and one goes so far as to characterize popular intent as a
necessary fiction. 95 But while the rhetorical formalist view might
descriptively capture what at least some judges are doing, the normative
strength of the claim is far weaker.
When judges profess to be mere agents of the electorate, they do three
related things at once, each of which is problematic. First, they endorse and
perpetuate the idea that the initiative permits the voters to make the choices of
law and policy that are contested in the litigation, even though the problems
described here cast that proposition sharply into doubt. Second, they conceal
the policy choices that, by virtue of the vacuity of popular intent, they
themselves must make. Third, they obscure the lines of accountability by
attributing the important choices to the voters and not to themselves.
The net effect is powerful but problematic because it helps to sustain
idealized and illusory ideas about direct democracy. Some decisions in the
study use impassioned prose to characterize the initiative as democracy in its
purest form, as the closest we can come to genuine popular sovereignty.'96
Judicial eloquence aside, the study powerfully suggests that formidable
obstacles prevent voters from autonomously making all the policy choices that
arise in connection with the initiatives they enact. By nevertheless attributing
all such choices to the voters, the rhetoric of popular intent conceals the
limitations of popular lawmaking and idealizes direct democracy as a vehicle
of pure popular sovereignty.
193. See Schacter, supra note 9, at 655.
194. See, e.g., Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEO. LJ. 353,
406 (1989).
195. See Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 799 P.2d 1220,
1235 (Cal. 1990) ("In order to further the fundamental right of the electorate to enact legislation through
the initiative process, this court must on occasion indulge in a presumption that the voters thoroughly study
and understand the content of complex initiative measures.").
196. See Yoshisato v. Superior Court, 831 P.2d 327, 333 (Cal. 1992); see also In re Estate of
Thompson, 692 P.2d 807, 808 (Wash. 1984).
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Viewed in terms of the two conceptions of law that I have suggested, the
rhetorical formalist solution declares an unconvincing victory for the positivist
conception. Like the textualist response, this approach suppresses the challenge
posed by the popular conception. Unlike the textualist response, this approach
does so through a judicial wink, an affirmation of popular intent strictly as a
fiction necessary to sustain judicial legitimacy. In thus denying the disjunction
between the two conceptions of law, the rhetorical formalist response leaves
the law to be covertly created by judges but overtly credited to the people.
C. A Different Approach: Courts, Candor, and Democracy
Each of the responses I have considered is seriously flawed. The particular
ways in which they fail, however, can help point in a more promising
direction. I distill from the deficiencies in these responses three ideas. First, the
inadequacies of improved intentionalism and textualism suggest that we should
be skeptical of formalist interpretive principles promising what they cannot
deliver. Second, the problems of rhetorical formalism suggest that we should
care about judicial rhetoric and the way it can sustain idealized representations
about law and politics. Third, we should ask whether a different interpretive
approach addresses-although it surely cannot eliminate-the problematic
disjunction between the positivist and popular conceptions of law.
Sometimes voters have resolved the interpretive question that confronts the
court, and in those cases, absent unconstitutionality, the court should honor a
clear electoral choice. Sometimes, conversely, an initiative law may be so
hopelessly ambiguous as to implicate the void-for-vagueness doctrine. 97 In
the face of initiatives neither self-evidently clear, nor unconstitutionally vague,
however, the question is how a court should choose from among competing,
plausible interpretations of the contested terms. Steadfastly insisting that voters
made a determinate, transparent policy choice or deploying the hollow fiction
that voters have done so are not the only options open to a court confronted
with the kinds of interpretive questions illustrated in the study.
197. See, e.g., Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 447-49 (S.D. Ohio 1994),
rev'd, 53 F3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995). Although reversed on appeal, the district court in Equality Foundation
ruled unconstitutional on numerous grounds a city charter amendment that prohibited the city from enacting
a law banning discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Finding the law to be plagued by what it
characterized as "abundant" confusion about its "scope and impact," id. at 448, the court struck it down
as, among other things, unconstitutionally vague. In so doing, the court noted that the ordinance amended
by this initiative subjected noncomplying employers to criminal penalties, and that the initiative burdened
legislative advocacy and political association, interests protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 444-46,
449. These elements traditionally strengthen a vagueness claim. See generally LAURENCE H. TRiBE,
AMERCAN CONSTItMONAL LAW § 12-31 (2d ed. 1988).
A question that merits study, in light of the problems discussed in this Article, is whether the void-
for-vagueness doctrine ought to be applied more frequently in the face of substantially ambiguous initiative
laws or, conversely, whether mechanisms should be developed that permit courts to return to the voters
initiatives that courts deem uninterpretable. For a discussion of other potential process reforms, see infra
text accompanying notes 234-43.
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A more promising direction would be for courts to acknowledge
forthrightly the limits of popular intent, and to resolve ambiguities through
interpretive rules that account for the factors that make it so problematic to say
what the electorate "meant." I have called this approach to statutory
interpretation "metademocratic" in other work addressing the legislative
process.19 The metademocratic model rejects the notion that only an
originalist approach to statutory interpretation can claim democratic legitimacy
and, instead, takes as its point of departure the inevitability of interpretive
discretion in giving meaning to statutory law. Shifting the focus from
eliminating to channeling judicial discretion in statutory construction, the
metademocratic approach reconfigures the idea of democratic legitimacy by
calling for the use of interpretive rules designed self-consciously to further a
larger vision of democracy. 99 I have argued that many contemporary theories
of interpretation, although rooted in starkly divergent conceptions of
democracy, may be understood within this metademocratic framework.2'u
In the domain of direct lawmaking, the metademocratic approach suggests
that, rather than perpetuating the futile pursuit of popular intent, interpretive
rules should be designed to select from among plausible statutory meanings in
ways that address the problems described in this study. Such rules would
derive their democratic legitimacy not from a feigned originalism, but from
their ability to resolve statutory ambiguity based on underlying ideas about
"democratizing" the direct lawmaking process. Rather than so unpersuasively
denying that a thick fog often surrounds popularly enacted law, in other words,
courts might acknowledge that fog and consider carefully the factors that create
it. And rather than denying or ignoring the disjunction between popular and
positivist conceptions of law, courts might instead confront that disjunction and
use it as their point of departure in choosing interpretive rules. Reconceived
198. See Schacter, supra note 9, at 606-46.
199. ld. at 606-11.
200. Id. I have argued that four variants of the metademocratic approach can be distilled from
contemporary theories of interpretation. Each exhorts courts to use interpretive principles calculated to
promote a distinctive vision of democracy. The doctrine spawned by the Supreme Court's holding in
Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), rooted in a democratic imperative
linked to maximizing electoral accountability, asks courts to "preserve politics" by deferring to
administrative agencies' reasonable interpretations of ambiguous regulatory statutes based on the claim that
agencies enjoy derivative executive accountability. Schacter, supra note 9, at 613-18. Principles drawn from
civic republicanism, critical race theory, feminism, and strains of postmodernism implore courts to resolve
ambiguity in ways that favor the interests of subordinated social groups as a way to pursue a democratic
vision of equality and inclusion that "reconstructs politics." Id. at 618-26. Principles building upon the
"legal process" tradition, including the work of legal pragmatists, ask judges to "complement politics" by
providing distanced reflection on interpretive questions in ways that can enhance democracy by improving
the quality and coherence of legislative law. Id. at 626-36. Textualist approaches, echoing important themes
of public choice theory, seek to "discipline politics" by requiring exacting textual specificity in ways
calculated to discourage perceived abuses of the legislative process. Id at 636-46.
The ideological diversity of these approaches challenges conventional notions of interpretive
"restraint" and suggests that metademocracy spans a wide spectrum. I have argued that debates over
statutory interpretation should move beyond reductive claims of activism and restraint, and should address
questions about which substantive vision of democracy should shape interpretive rules. Id. at 660-63.
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in these terms, interpretive litigation can provide a structure for making visible
and addressing some of the problems described in this Article."0'
Framing metademocratic interpretive rules for the initiative process
requires identifying the ways in which the democratic aspirations of the direct
lawmaking process are compromised. The analysis offered here points to some
salient dynamics. To be sure, the set of decisions collected here cannot capture
the universe of problems that undermine the democratic character of the
initiative process.202 This is particularly so because these cases, by definition,
exclude claims of unconstitutionality, where rules of constitutional law and not
of interpretation should be the appropriate response to the antidemocratic
character of particular initiatives.20 3 But the decisions explored here can
substantially augment and enrich our understanding of the democratic character
of the initiative process. What the study most strongly suggests is that the
informational dynamics of direct lawmaking impede deliberation and create
opportunities for strategic abuse of the process. These problems, in turn,
undermine the meaningful political participation and equality that are important
preconditions of vibrant democratic processes." 4 Problems of this sort are
201. As I argue below, courts need not be the only institutional structure for addressing these
problems, but they can help to catalyze action by other institutions. See infra text accompanying notes
234-43.
202. The scope of direct democracy is enormous. See Charlow, supra note 6, at 528 & n. I (describing
wide use of direct lawmaking mechanisms at state and local levels and noting that "[t]he total number of
referenda nationally, including local measures, may have been as high as 10,000 to 15,000 annually around
1970"). Given this scale, no empirical study based solely on decided cases could achieve universality
because many ballot propositions generate no litigation.
203. Paradigmatic examples are initiatives that selectively curtail or burden the political rights and
opportunities of identifiable groups, like racial minorities or gay men and lesbians. See Hunter v. Erickson,
393 U.S. 385 (1969); Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 1092 (1995).
The metademocratic interpretive rules I propose for application in nonconstitutional cases are meant to
complement, not substitute for, these constitutional doctrines. Contemporary ballot propositions restricting
benefits to immigrants, the availability of civil rights protection for gay men and lesbians, and affirmative
action remedies raise these constitutional problems quite starkly. On the larger question of the extent to
which mechanisms of direct democracy systematically subjugate minorities, see Symposium, Anti-Gay
Ballot Initiatives, supra note 6, at 491-93; Baker, supra note 6, at 708-11; Bell, supra note 6, at 1-9;
Charlow, supra note 6, at 529-31; Eule, supra note 2, at 1548-49. See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR,
IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994)
(presenting overarching model that argues for distinction between "minoritarian" and "majoritarian" bias
in law and legal institutions).
204. For arguments advocating the centrality of participation and deliberation to democracy, see
generally BENJAmIN R. BARBER, STRONG DMOCRACy: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE
117-311 (1984) (arguing for transformative vision of participatory politics and citizenry active in various
levels of political and social life); FRONTIERS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 95-323 (Henry S. Kariel ed., 1970)
(providing excerpts from theorists stressing link between participation and democracy); CAROLE PATEMAN,
PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 67-111 (1970) (arguing for extension of participatory
democracy to workplace); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE LJ. 1539, 1548-51
(1988) (describing arguments forcentrality of deliberation to democracy). For arguments advocating a broad
conception of equality in democratic theory, see IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF
DIFFERENCE 116-21, 163-68 (1990); Sunstein, supra, at 1552-53. For a discussion of interpretive rules
shaped by these democratic values, see Schacter, supra note 9, at 618-26 (discussing approaches to
"reconstructing politics"); id. at 656 & nn.326-27, 663 (discussing linkages between democracy and
equality).
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hardly unique to the initiative process, 5 but they are acute and contextually
shaped in this setting in ways that should drive the rules courts use to construe
initiatives. As I discuss these problems, I distinguish between issues of
deliberation and issues of abuse.
1. Informational Deficits: Interpretation and Deliberation
One set of problems involves informational deficits in the initiative
process. Several factors impede meaningful collective deliberation about
proposed initiatives. Voters often do not read proposed laws, but instead rely
on media coverage that is frequently reductive. The laws and the ballot
pamphlets explaining them are difficult to comprehend. The obscuring legal
jargon in initiatives and the gaps in the public's knowledge about the
surrounding legal context hamper voters' ability to weigh and assess proposals.
Even when voters read and understand proposed laws, they may fail to
anticipate or consider an issue that arises only when the initiative law is later
applied to a particular set of facts. These factors leave citizen-lawmakers
poorly situated to deliberate about proposed initiatives.
Interpretive litigation about the meaning of an ambiguous term in an
initiative can compensate for some of these informational deficits and create
a structure for the deliberation that was absent from the process that produced
the initiative. The litigants, as well as any intervenors and amici curiae, can
explore in depth and argue the merits of different plausible interpretations of
the initiative. The court can assign meaning to the contested provision with the
benefit of this extended exploration and the court's own knowledge of the legal
context in which the initiative is situated. Viewed from this perspective, the
adjudicative process can act as a complementary adjunct to the direct
lawmaking process.'
Consider an example from the study. In SDDS, Inc. v. State, 7 the South
Dakota Supreme Court construed an initiative that provided that no large-scale
solid waste facility could be operated unless the state legislature "enact[ed] a
bill approving" the facility.208 The legislature in that case did so, and the
governor signed the bill. Opponents of the facility, however, obtained enough
signatures to subject the law to a referendum, in which the voters could rescind
the law prior to its taking effect. The question was whether the legislature's
law approving the facility should be deemed "enacted" within the meaning of
the initiative even though, under the state's constitution, the law approving the
205. See Schacter, supra note 9, at 660-63 (describing problems of structural inequality in legislative
process and linking them to democratic theories underlying different interpretive rules). As I discuss in Part
VI, versions of each of these problems plague the legislative domain as well and should be addressed there.
206. Id. at 626-36 (discussing interpretive rules designed to "complement politics").
207. 481 N.W.2d 270 (S.D. 1992).
208. Id at 271.
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facility would now be subjected to a referendum before taking effect. Relying
upon what it considered to be the important policy of protecting the
referendum process, the South Dakota court ruled that the law approving the
facility could not be deemed "enacted" for purposes of the initiative until the
referendum was held.
This decision was atypical of the study set because the court did not
invoke popular intent, characterize the decision as one dictated by the voters'
will, or adopt a hypertechnical interpretation of the word "enact." Instead, the
court viewed the word "enact," in the context of the initiative, as unclear and
poorly chosen. The court thus chose a construction of the term that was
consistent with the state's policy subjecting all legislatively enacted laws to the
referendum process." 9
The interpretive litigation in SDDS gave the participants and the court the
opportunity to probe an issue that voters, in all likelihood, neither considered
nor had reason to anticipate: What would happen if opponents gathered
sufficient signatures to trigger a referendum on the legislative law? As SDDS
demonstrates, a court's choice from among competing constructions is
unavoidably value laden, but it can also be one that is based on the kind of
informed deliberation in which the voters did not-and could not-have
engaged when they enacted the law.
The judicial process is not a perfect substitute for a more robustly
deliberative initiative process. But if initiative lawmaking is seen as an
ongoing, multi-institutional process that necessarily involves voters at one point
and courts at another, then interpretive litigation can go some distance toward
ameliorating the informational and deliberative deficits suggested by the study.
The adjudicative process could most appropriately and effectively do so,
moreover, if courts maximized procedural opportunities for participation by a
range of interests. In addition to liberally granting applications for intervention
and for amicus curiae participation, courts should consider appointing pro bono
representation for unrepresented, or even unorganized, interests.1
2. Informational Pathologies: Interpretation and Abuse of
the Initiative Process
A different set of problems suggested by the study relates not simply to
a failure of deliberation, but to some troubling structural inequalities in the
process. The informational deficits described above, combined with the apathy
209. Id. at 272.
210. Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 568(c) (1993) (authorizing subsidized participation for affected interests in
proceedings under Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990); David M. Rosenzweig, Note, Confession of Error
in the Supreme Court by the Solicitor General, 82 GEo. L.J. 2079, 2113 (1994) ('It is well settled, for
example, that the [Supreme] Court has the authority to appoint counsel, in the capacity of amicus curiae,
to argue any position in a case, even when a party refuses to do so.').
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of large segments of the electorate, create fertile terrain for highly organized,
concentrated, and well-funded interests to abuse and manipulate the initiative
process. Informational asymmetries allow such interests to strategically
propound, package, and draft initiatives in ways that enable them, in some
circumstances, to create a phantom popular intent and thus to appropriate the
political authority of the largely passive electorate.
The study suggests some factors that increase the risks of abuse. Laws that
are lengthy, densely packed with legal jargon, or complex are likely to be the
most problematic. Length and complexity will minimize voter engagement and
increase the power of proponents to use initiatives to change the law in ways
not completely understood by, or clearly communicated to, the voters.
Initiatives worded in ways that obscure the effect of a "yes" vote pose similar
problems. Heavy spending on subliminally directed advertising, particularly if
it is one-sided, can increase the risk of abuse by focusing voters on abstract,
visceral symbols and diverting them from the particulars of the proposed
initiative.1 2 The potential for exploitation is particularly severe when the
initiative explicitly or implicitly targets socially marginalized groups, for such
issues may inflame popular passions. 1 Perhaps to the chagrin of James
Madison and his devotees, 214 the direct lawmaking process is not alone in its
capacity to inflame majorities to the detriment of socially subordinated
minorities,25 but the structural attributes of direct democracy powerfully
enable this phenomenon.
In the face of factors like these, but in the absence of a claim or finding
of unconstitutionality, courts should be reluctant to construe ambiguous words
in initiative laws expansively.26 The clearest examples in the study are the
211. See generally DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 24, at 113-14 (discussing hidden consequences of
"Trojan horse" provisions).
212. The frequency with which one-sided spending is observed in interpretive cases may be lower than
the frequency with which such spending actually occurs; data suggests that one-sided oppositional spending
is more likely to be effective than one-sided spending in support of a measure. See ZISK, supra note 94,
at 115-16; Daniel H. Lowenstein, Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions: Recent Experience, Public
Choice Theory and the First Amendment, 29 UCLA L. REv. 505, 517-19, 544-47 (1982). Successful
oppositional spending means the initiative is rejected and consequently requires no interpretation. But the
fact that one-sided spending is sufficiently potent to defeat many initiatives nevertheless underscores the
fact that well-funded interests have leverage to manipulate the process.
213. On the ways in which exploitation of this kind operates in the domain of direct democracy, see
Bell, supra note 6, at 1-9; Eule, supra note 2, at 1522-30. For an analysis of how the rhetoric of antigay
initiative campaigns appeals to race-based fear and animus, see Schacter, supra note 72, at 300-07.
214. See Eule, supra note 2, at 1522-30 (discussing Madison's antipathy to direct democracy).
215. A dramatic example of this dynamic in contemporary legislative politics is the unrelenting use
of a caricatured depiction of the "welfare mother" in the debate about welfare reform. See Dorothy E.
Roberts, The Value of Black Mothers' Work, 26 CONN. L. REV. 871, 873 (1994) (describing "image of the
lazy Black welfare queen who breeds children to fatten her allowance"); Lucy A. Williams, The Ideology
of Division: Behavior Modification Welfare Reform Proposals, 102 YALE LJ. 719, 741 (1992) (describing
how "ideology of division" in welfare reform debate "play[s] to America's deepest racial fears and to
resentment of the poor, single, unemployed mother").
216. When a court is construing an initiative solely to determine its constitutionality, these same factors
militate in favor of an opposite rule of construction. A court confronted with a constitutional initiative that
targets a socially subordinated group, for example, would better account for the risks of abuse if it assumed
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many initiatives-especially from California-that modify crimes and defenses,
criminal procedure, penalties, and sentencing rules. Contemporary experience
suggests that this is an area where voters are likely to have focused heavily on
broad themes and slogans about being "tough on crime," some of which are
mixed subtly and not so subtly with coded racial messages.2"7
One notable example is the television advertising that supported
California's Proposition 115, the subject of several decisions in the study. That
initiative expanded death penalty statutes, established new criminal liability,
imposed wide and detailed reforms in criminal procedure, and limited the
rights afforded criminal defendants under California's constitution.
Commercials supporting Proposition 115 spotlighted Richard Ramirez, the
convicted "Night Stalker" murderer.2 ' Ramirez's image repeatedly appeared
in commercials decrying the asserted "loopholes" and "delay" in the state's
criminal justice system. Broad, visceral appeals like those deployed 'in these
political advertisements forcefully distract the electorate from the arcane, albeit
potent, details of laws such as Proposition 115.
Because Proposition 115 was 3764 words long19-roughly fifteen
double-spaced typewritten pages-it is wildly unlikely that most voters focused
at all on the interpretive questions facing the court, such as whether
Proposition 115 authorized hearsay testimony in a preliminary hearing by
someone without personal knowledge of the case,' or whether it authorized
a court to order disclosure of a defense witness's address and to sanction a
noncomplying attorney.22' The combined force of visceral imagery and
language that is both complex and ambiguous suggests that Proposition 115's
proponents were well situated to exploit the initiative process through strategic
drafting and advertising. This influence militates in favor of a narrow
construction of the law, one that declines to permit ambiguous language to
work major changes in the law when there are strong reasons to doubt that
voters considered and approved specific changes. 2
True, the overarching "tough on crime" character of laws like Proposition
115 might point in the opposite direction. If the voters' broad "purpose" was
deemed the interpretive benchmark, then ambiguities should be construed to
in its constitutional analysis that the initiative would be applied broadly, not narrowly. In the context I
address, however, a court applies an initiative that has either survived, or not demanded, constitutional
scrutiny.
217. See generally JAMIESON, supra note 105, at 15-42 (analyzing controversial "Willie Horton"
advertisements used during 1988 presidential campaign and describing power of racially charged political
advertising).
218. See California Elections: The Ad Campaign, L.A. TIMES, May 31, 1990, at A33.
219. DBI, supra note 92, at 86.
220. See Whitman v. Superior Court, 820 P.2d 262, 265-68 (Cal. 1991).
221. See In re Littlefield, 851 P.2d 42, 48, 52 (Cal. 1993).
222. If an initiative was enacted under circumstances like these, but has clear and unambiguous
language, then the remedy must be found in constitutional law. The analysis I offer assumes some
ambiguity in the law. Whether a law is ambiguous is, of course, a point itself likely to be contested in
many cases.
[Vol. 105: 107
The Pursuit of "Popular Intent"
further that larger purpose. Using a broad-purpose approach in circumstances
like these, however, would encourage exactly the abuse of the initiative process
that I have described. Applying a narrowing rule, in contrast, would reduce the
incentives for initiative proponents to draft long, intricate, and ambiguous laws,
the complexity of which can effectively be shrouded by slogans and
soundbites.
In a sense, the proposed narrowing approach reaches the same result as
would the traditional "rule of lenity," a canon favoring the construction of
ambiguous criminal laws against the government because of underlying
concerns about notice and due process?23 But instead of basing the decision
on the fantasy that voters enacted the initiative with the rule of lenity (or any
other canon) in mind, this approach would instead scrutinize the process
surrounding the passage of the law and choose a rule designed to address the
systematic problems in that process.
3. The New Interpretive Rules in Action: Problems and Prospects
In a system that adopts the rules I suggest, litigants and courts would be
required to develop factors for distinguishing between the sorts of problems I
have described here-that is, for distinguishing between the absence of
deliberation (which characterizes the direct lawmaking process generally) and
the abuse of the initiative process (which characterizes a subset of initiatives).
The narrowing, antiabuse rules of construction I suggest for the Proposition
115 cases differ from the broad, prodeliberative rule I propose for the SDDS
case. What is the basis for the distinction? I have suggested some "danger
signals" that increase the risk of abuse of the initiative process: length,
complexity, confusing wording, obscurity about the effect of an affirmative
vote, heavy advertising (especially when coded with race-based or similar
symbols), and propositions explicitly or implicitly targeted at socially
subordinated groups. 4 Consider these factors in the context of the examples
I have used. The initiative at issue in SDDS was relatively short and plainly
worded, whereas Proposition 115 was approximately 3700 words long, full of
legal terms of art, and concerned with rarefied questions of legal procedure.
SDDS involved a relatively straightforward question with an unanticipated
twist; Proposition 115 involved arcane questions of criminal procedure. In
addition, unlike the SDDS initiative, Proposition 115 was promoted through
exploitative, race-tinged advertising.
223. On the rule of lenity, see ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 10, at 655-56.
224. As an aid to judicial interpretation, it may be appropriate to require that a record of advertising
materials used in the initiative campaign be maintained. This could be assembled by litigants as part of
interpretive litigation or be routinely maintained by state election officials. For a review of existing state
laws regulating maintenance of advertising "logs" by media outlets, see DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 24,
at 50-58.
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Taken together, these differences provide a basis for distinguishing the
absence of deliberation in the SDDS initiative from the risks of manipulation
in the case of Proposition 115. This distinction is, nevertheless, neither self-
evident nor self-executing. There will undoubtedly be debates about which
rules should be applied in which cases. But indeterminacy objections should
not disqualify these metademocratic rules.2" Virtually all interpretive rules
require value-laden line drawing by judges. The important question is not how
to avoid the inevitable need for line drawing, but what kinds of lines we want
courts to draw. The decisions collected here suggest that asking courts to draw
lines around a controlling popular intent provides only a thin veneer for policy
choices that courts make in the name of vindicating popular intent. The
metademocratic approach I propose, though also value laden, abandons the
failed formalism that inspires popular intent and reconceives democratic
legitimacy in terms of democracy-enhancing rules.
Moreover, rules chosen for their capacity to be applied uncontroversially
have important shortcomings of their own. Perhaps the clearest example of a
"bright line" metademocratic rule would be a universal rule of narrow
construction applied to all initiative laws based on the systemic problems in
the direct lawmaking process. 226 But that rule would be flawed in important
respects. First, consistent with its focus on the initiative's text, it would
replicate some of the basic problems posed by the "strong textualist" response.
Placing such exclusive and dispositive weight on the statutory text and its
clarity in all cases might produce desirable consequences from the standpoint
of reforming drafting, but it would mean that policy outcomes would always
turn on a source that is peripheral at best, and incomprehensible at worst, to
voters. In addition, such a rule would unwisely treat all initiatives identically
and thus fail to draw contextual distinctions between different laws and the
differently configured processes that produce them. 27 Finally, asking judges
to subject only popularly enacted law to this disfavored interpretive treatment
might create a powerful perception of elitism and, at the very least, raise the
question whether legislative laws must likewise be subjected to the same
across-the-board treatment.2  If the notion were that the existence of
225. I probe and respond in more depth to formalist objections to metademocratic rules in Schacter,
supra note 9, at 650-55.
226. See Kelso, supra note 7, at 344-45 (arguing that California initiatives "should be strictly
construed in order to minimize the changes to California law").
227. The relevance of such contextual differences in construing legislative statutes is explored and
argued at length in Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405,
462-508 (1989).
228. If nothing else, it may well be difficult to persuade judges to adopt this stance because the vast
majority of the states that authorize the initiative elect their judges. See Eule, supra note 2, at 1587-90.
Carving out laws enacted by the voters for special rules of narrow construction may be politically untenable
for elected judges. To some extent, any version of the approach I propose raises this problem, and the
elected status of judges might give us a clue as to why their opinions are so often filled with impassioned
prose about the sanctity of direct democracy. The more contextual approach I advance might, however, at
least mitigate some of these problems of perception.
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problems in the lawmaking process must always lead to narrow construction,
then there would be a strong case for applying the same rule in the legislative
context-as, indeed, observers such as Judge Frank Easterbrook have
argued. 9 Adopting that stance across the board, however, would carry with
it a problematic antiregulatory-or at least, pro-status quo-bias that introduces
a specter of "Lochnerism."' 0 Although it would not produce antiregulatory
results in every case,21 such a rule, applied across the range of statutes,
would burden the enactment of efficacious laws by imposing a heightened
standard of clarity upon drafters. Viewed in this light, a universal rule of
narrow construction seems too blunt an instrument.
Interpretive rules of the kind I suggest are no panacea. Judges should not
be romanticized as populists. In addition, the courts, like other institutions,
suffer from structural inequalities of their own."sa Litigation is expensive and
meaningful access to courts limited. Broader amicus curiae participation and
pro bono representation could partially mitigate the inequalities of access, but
these inequalities would not be eliminated entirely. Moreover, candor is not
without its costs; it is possible that more forthright judicial practices will
increase public cynicism about courts.
Because, however, interpretation is inevitable, the interpretive power of
judges is largely ineradicable, and doctrinal attempts to conceal that power are
unconvincing, there remain gains that can justify these costs. Consider some
potentially significant benefits. First, the rules I describe can improve outcomes
in specific cases by infusing the initiative lawmaking process with norms
favoring deliberation and discouraging abuses of the process. The direct effect
of applying metademocratic rules on the larger initiative process will
admittedly be marginal because only a subset of cases necessitate interpretive
229. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 549 (1983).
230. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down law regulating workers' hours).
Lochner has come to symbolize the dangers of antiregulatory judicial obstructionism. See generally TRIBE,
supra note 197, § 8-2 (discussing association of Lochner with "period [during which] the Supreme Court
was quite willing--certainly more willing than it has otherwise ever been-to scrutinize and invalidate
economic regulations pursuant to the due process clause").
231. In some cases, a narrowing construction might defeat this larger aim. Adopting such a rule in
interpreting a law enacting market-based "regulatory reform" provides an example. Nevertheless, applied
in all cases, we could expect the aggregate effect of such a rule to narrow the overall corpus of statutory
law. As Judge Easterbrook has readily stated, the animating purpose of deploying such a rule across the
range of all cases is to discourage robust statutory law and to support the primacy of private ordering. See
Easterbrook, supra note 229, at 549 (justifying narrowing rules of construction based on norm that "most
social relations would be governed by private agreements, customs, and understandings, not resolved in the
halls of government").
232. See KO,_SAR, supra note 203, at 124-28.
233. For competing views about the wisdom of candor in statutory interpretation, compare GumO
CALABREsI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATurEs 180 (1982) ("Without honesty and candor we
cannot even know where we are.") with Zeppos, supra note 194, at 385-86 (arguing that candor may
undermine judicial legitimacy if judicial decisionmaking process cannot clearly be distinguished from that
employed by political branches).
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litigation. But for those cases, the interpretive results may be more thoughtful
and more honest.
Metademocratic rules may, moreover, produce more systematic results by
helping to challenge and change prevailing assumptions about direct
democracy. The approach I have described can help to generate a more
realistic picture of the initiative process by bringing to the fore some of the
chronic problems illustrated by the cases analyzed here. This judicial approach
can thus help bring the popular lawmaking process into clearer focus and
challenge idealistic representations of the initiative as an instrument of pure
popular sovereignty. Debates about individual initiatives and, indeed, about the
desirability of popular lawmaking more generally, would be enriched by
highlighting the informational dynamics and associated systemic problems
discussed above. Making more visible the inevitably substantial role courts
play in shaping direct legislation would similarly enrich these debates.
This effect depends, in part, upon the proposition that what judges say
matters, that judicial rhetoric has some role in creating public understandings
about our political institutions. Nothing in this Article would suggest that
voters parse judicial opinions with care. Yet in a more diffuse sense, courts
represent one of many places where larger understandings about our politics
and institutions are forged 34 How the judiciary conceives of the initiative
process and represents it in language contributes to the creation of social
understandings, especially given the relatively high visibility of the popular
lawmaking process and the fact that media sources frequently publicize judicial
decisions resolving high-profile cases in this area. 5 Judicial approaches to
interpretation can also spawn wider debates about the political process that
generates legislation, such as the debates about congressional behavior that
Justice Scalia's skeptical approach to legislative history has ignited. 6
Perhaps more important than the constitutive capacity of judicial rhetoric
is the power of courts to prompt action by other institutions. Changing the
rules of interpretation in a way that reveals and elaborates underlying structural
problems that burden the initiative process can help to generate reforms in that
process. Potential reforms meriting study span a wide spectrum, from relatively
incremental changes designed to improve existing processes for initiative
lawmaking,237 all the way to elimination of the initiative.238 It is beyond
234. See LISA J. MCINTYRE, LAW IN THE SOCIOLOGICAL ENTERPRISE: A RECONSTRUCION 109-35
(1994) (discussing "constitutive effects of law"); Schacter, supra note 9, at 649 & n.293 (discussing
"constitutive" theories of law and their relevance to interpretive practices).
235. Eule, supra note 2, at 1581-82, 1585.
236. See, e.g., The Role of Legislative History in Judicial Interpretation: A Discussion Between Judge
Kenneth W Starr and Judge Abner J. Mikva, 1987 DuKE L.J. 361; see also Biskupic, supra note 176, at
913 (describing congressional hearings about statutory interpretation prompted largely by Justice Scalia's
views).
237. Comprehensive and detailed reforms have recently been proposed. See, e.g., DBI, supra note 92,
at 327-46 (setting out proposals by California Commission on Campaign Financing that relate to drafting
and amendability; preelection public hearings; circulation and qualification; required number of votes for
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the bounds of this Article to explore these reforms in any detail, but three
possible reforms emerge as most clearly responsive to the problems suggested
by the decisions studied. These possibilities illustrate the kinds of reforms that
metademocratic rules might encourage other institutions to explore, and thus
illustrate an important, but unexplored and undervalued linkage between
interpretive rules and the political process.
First, drafting reforms are the most obvious example. At least some of the
problems described here could perhaps be productively addressed by requiring
clearer, less jargon-filled, and substantially shorter laws. 9  Second,
consideration might be given to discontinuing the initiative in selected areas
where the risks of confusion, manipulation, or exploitation are likely to be
most severe, much as several states currently restrict the use of direct
lawmaking in particular circumstances. 240 The study suggests that these risks
are particularly acute, for example, where voters are asked to enact detailed
rules of legal procedure governing the process that adjudicates criminal
guilt.241 Risks of manipulation and exploitation are likewise severe when the
initiative process is used to allow voters to alter the architecture of the
democratic process in ways that disadvantage socially subordinated groups, as
passage; enhanced disclosure requirements; application of "fairness doctrine" to ballot measures; reforming
ballot pamphlets; studying campaign finance limitations; considering fee-based "voter information funds"
to redress one-sided advertising; and revised judicial review concerning conflicting ballot measures);
DuBois & FEENEY, supra note 24, at 161-73 (setting out proposals by California Policy Seminar that relate
to changing qualifications for ballots; reducing number and complexity, and increasing clarity, of initiatives;
improving ballot pamphlets; and strengthening campaign finance and disclosure restrictions); Richard B.
Collins & Dale Oesterle, Structuring the Ballot Initiative: Procedures that Do and Don't Work, 66 U.
COLO. L. REv. 47, 104-26 (1995) (recommending numerous reforms, including use of indirect initiatives;
word limits; legislative power to amend constitutional initiatives; heightened enforcement of single-subject
rule; and several changes to qualification and election processes designed to enhance discussion and debate
about proposed initiatives).
238. For divergent views on the wisdom of direct democracy, compare Ronald J. Allen, The National
Initiative Proposal: A Preliminary Analysis, 58 NEB. L. REv. 965 (1979) with Cynthia L. Fountaine, Note,
Lousy Lawmaking: Questioning the Desirability and Constitutionality of Legislating by Initiative, 61 S.
CAL L. REv. 733 (1988). For a proposal to expand direct democracy to the national level, but to reform
its processes dramatically, see BARBER, supra note 204, at 281-89 (proposing legislative initiative and
referendum process with "a mandatory tie-in with neighborhood assemblies and interactive-television town
meetings for the purpose of civic education"; multichoice format that would permit voters to register the
intensity of their policy preferences; and "two reading" format "to guard against a too-impetuous citizenry
or a too-powerful elite gaining temporary control of public opinion," which would include "two voting
stages, separated by six months of deliberation and debate"). For proposals concerning a national
referendum on constitutional amendments, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 54-55
(1991); Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1043 (1988). Cf. RICHARD D. PARKER, "HERE, THE PEOPLE RULE": A CONSTITTIONAL PoPULjsT
MANIFESO 54-65 (1994) (calling for infusion of constitutional law with "populist sensibility").
239. For proposals along these lines, see DBI, supra note 92, at 110-19,331,337; DUBOIS & FEENEY,
supra note 24, at 135-36; MAGLEBY, supra note 15, at 195; Collins & Oesterle, supra note 237, at 109.
240. For example, in Massachusetts, the initiative may not be used for measures relating to religion,
and in Alaska, Massachusetts, and Wyoming, the initiative may not be used for measures affecting the
courts. See DuBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 24, at 24-28 (describing these and other restrictions in different
states).
241. See supra notes 217-23 and accompanying text (discussing criminal justice reform cases).
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in the case of contemporary antigay ballot initiatives.242 Finally, and more
fundamentally, the initiative might be reconceived as a general policy directive
rather than a vehicle for enacting specific rules in complex areas. The
decisions analyzed here suggest that initiatives are far better suited to express
broad policy preferences than to write detailed, technical laws. Whether such
a reconceived initiative were binding or advisory, it would still enable the
electorate to exercise a significant role in the political process. As David
Magleby has noted:
[Voters could have profound influence over the issue agenda by
means of advisory referendums such as the 1975 British vote on entry
into the European Economic Community. The wording of the
referendum was short and straightforward. The advantage of this
approach is that the public can indicate its preference for general
policy and the legislature can handle the statutory or constitutional
steps necessary for the implementation and administration of the
policy.
243
Reforms like these are more likely to reach the public agenda if the underlying
difficulties in the direct lawmaking process are made visible. Shifting the
interpretive stance of courts can increase the visibility of problems that courts
are well situated to see and can thus be part of a larger, more institutionally
interactive set of responses to these problems. In doing so, this new
interpretive stance can further the metademocratic goal of improving
democratic processes and institutions.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY
This study casts substantial doubt on the popular-intent approach as it has
been both conceived and applied by courts. Analyzing the judicial pursuit of
popular intent within the context of social science research about voter
behavior in ballot campaigns reveals that pursuit to be both misguided and
242. Indeed, precisely this idea is reflected in judicial decisions declaring antigay initiatives
unconstitutional because such laws ."fenc[e] out' [of the political process] an independently identifiable
class of persons." Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1339 (Colo. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 1092
(1995) (quoting Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1282 (Colo.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993)); see
also Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 430-34 (S.D. Ohio 1994), rev'd, 53 F.3d 261
(6th Cir. 1995).
243. MAGLEBY, supra note 15, at 195; Cf CRONIN, supra note 15, at 240-41 (suggesting that advisory
referenda could "stimulate public debate, attract voter interest, and allow the public to play at least some
role beyond selecting the people sent to the state legislatures," but arguing that such referenda should be
a "complement to rather than a substitute for the regular system"). Shifting more authority to the legislative
and/or executive branches in this fashion would not obviate the need or justification for metademocratic
rules of interpretation because those institutional settings suffer from democratic flaws of their own. See
generally Schacter, supra note 9, at 613-46, 662-63 (discussing various critiques of contemporary
democratic institutions that inspire theories of interpretation). But such a reform would respond to some
of the most serious problems suggested by the cases studied here.
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impoverished. The search for popular intent is misguided because of the
characteristic weaknesses of intentionalism, the lack of voter engagement with,
or comprehension of, the interpretive issues confronting courts, and the striking
disjunction between the sources that influence voters and those that influence
courts. The search for popular intent is impoverished because all of these
factors, when combined with the informational deficits and pathologies
explored here, reveal the extent to which the very concept of popular intent is
rooted in reductive, illusory ideas about the direct lawmaking process. I have
argued that these problems, in turn, reveal a deeper rupture between positivist
and popular conceptions of law, and call for alternative interpretive rules
framed in light of some of the problems the study suggests are characteristic
of the initiative process.
While the study bears most directly upon the interpretation of popularly
enacted law, there are larger implications here for statutory interpretation and
legal theory. Despite some important structural differences between the
representative and direct lawmaking processes, there are commonalities
suggesting that the two are better located on a continuum than in dichotomous
opposition to one another. At least at the level of ideal type, the representative
process offers a far greater opportunity for deliberation and debate.244 But at
the level of actual experience, our legislative process frequently falls far short
of the ideal type, so that the differences between the two lawmaking processes
may be more in degree than kind.245
For example, legislators, like voters, frequently do not meaningfully
deliberate, do not write--or even read-the text of bills, make voting decisions
based on proxies or cues (such as interest group or party position), do not
foresee or understand issues that arise after they enact statutes, and engage in
strategic behavior. Media sources such as television, talk radio, and newspapers
heavily influence legislators. There are, in other words, informational deficits
and informational pathologies in the legislative process, just as there are in the
initiative process." To the extent that these factors hamper popular laws,
they also hamper legislative laws, though often less visibly so.
More fundamentally, while the disjunction between what I have called
"positivist" and "popular" conceptions of law is quite stark in the context of
direct democracy, it is not limited to that context. The same disjunction can be
244. See Eule, supra note 2, at 1526.
245. This point is emphasized in Richard Briffault, Distrust of Democracy, 63 Tax. L. REV. 1347
(1985) (reviewing MAGLEBY, supra note 15).
246. Contemporary legislative politics provide some vivid illustrations. See, e.g., Stephen Engelberg,
Business Leaves the Lobby and Sits at Congress's Table, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1995, at Al (describing
role of business lawyers and lobbyists in drafting antiregulatory legislation that elected representatives then
sponsor); Elizabeth Kolbert, When a Grass-Roots Drive Actually Isn't, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1995, at Al
(describing rise of "synthetic grass-roots movements," reflected in television commercials featuring actors
appearing to be ordinary citizens, as prime example of how interest groups attempt to influence legislators
by "changing the climate of public opinion, largely through television advertising").
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observed, as well, in the legislative setting, where it also poses serious
challenges for some core premises of statutory interpretation.
The traditional model of legitimacy in statutory interpretation reflects an
approach that draws a sharp distinction between the functions of the legislative
and judicial branches of government based upon the perceived demands of
democratic theory. The traditional approach demands interpretive "restraint"
as a way to enable the dynamic of electoral accountability to operate; voters
can assess the choices made by legislators only if those choices are clear and
unobscured by judicial choices covertly made in the name of interpretation.
The popular conception of law, however, calls into question the extent to
which the dynamic of accountability can operate. The problem is that voters
receive information about, and come to understand, legislative law from a
sprawling and diffuse set of sources-most prominently assorted media. As
with initiative laws, the meanings that voters attach to legislative laws and
other governmental policies flow as much-if not more-from ongoing, media-
driven processes than from the bare legal language of law or other formal legal
sources.
Consider the Civil Rights Act of 1991,247 which emerged from
protracted, highly publicized legislative battles. The enduring legacy of those
battles was the endless debate over whether that bill, designed to overrule a set
of restrictive Supreme Court interpretations of federal antidiscrimination laws,
legitimated "quotas." 248 That question, in turn, implicated complex and
somewhat rarefied legal questions about the scope and meaning of prior
statutory law and judicial interpretation in that area. Despite the extensive press
coverage the "quota" controversy received, little of the legal complexity
was-or perhaps could have been-captured in the media's characterizations
and coverage of the debate.
The ability of voters to make informed choices about the 1991 legislation
enacted by their representatives depends upon their ability to learn the effect,
scope, and likely consequences of that law. Yet it is hard to have confidence
that much more than sloganeering contributed to popular understanding of
precisely what the 1991 law said or meant. And the 1991 Act, high profile as
it was, is hardly unique in this regard.
For example, 1994's debates about federal health care reform and crime
control legislation vividly illustrated the difference between public awareness
of the text of a law or proposed law-which sometimes runs into the
thousands of pages-and public awareness of the rhetoric about the laws. The
saturation coverage accorded to the latter was hardly matched with similar
coverage of the former. Moreover, lawmakers on all sides seem to have
247. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 601, 1201-24; 16
U.S.C. §§ la-5 note; 29 U.S.C. § 626; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1981 notes, 1981a, 1988, 2000e, 2000e note,
2000e-1, 2000e-2, 2000e-4, 2000e-4 note, 2000e-5, 2000e-16, 12111, 12112, 12209 (Supp. 1991)).
248. See Schacter, supra note 72, at 303 (reviewing rhetoric that surrounded debate).
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become ever more sophisticated about the power of rhetoric and
characterization, as evidenced, for example, by the strategically chosen,
sometimes "Orwellian," 249 titles given to legislation.
This pervasive "spin" of law seriously undermines the possibility of
meaningful electoral accountability. Thus, the problems with popular intent
suggest some deep and difficult problems with legislative intent as well.
Beyond statutory interpretation, these issues raise profound questions by
fundamentally challenging the idea of "notice" at the heart of the traditional
rule of law: Is there a "meaning" in legal texts that citizens can ever know and
distinguish from mere characterizations of law that appear in press and other
accounts? Can we distinguish law, as it is passed, from law as it is portrayed
and perceived in the sprawling, symbol-rich, high-tech social process that
creates legal meanings? This study suggests that we need to revisit traditional
ideas of accountability and notice to meet the challenge of a legal order that,
increasingly, cannot be meaningfully confined to the traditional domains of
law.
249. The phrase is from Anthony Lewis, Tilting the Scales, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1995, at A19
(describing proposed "Common Sense Legal Reform Act" as having "wonderfully Orwellian name"). For
an example, see Ana Puga, House GOP Aims to Halt "Frivolous" Prison Litigation, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb.
5, 1995, at 2 (describing proposed amendments to Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997 (1988), that would limit substantially civil rights lawsuits that inmates may file).
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APPENDIX A: THE STATUTORY INmATIVE IN THE STATES AND THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
STATE SOURcE OF AuTHoRrry
Alaska ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 1
Arizona ARIz. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1
Arkansas ARK. CONST. amend. 7
California CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8
Colorado COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1
District of Columbia D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-285 (1992)
Idaho IDAHO CONST. art. II, § 1
Maine ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, § 18
Massa~husetts MASS. CONST. art. XLVIII, pt. 1
Michigan MICH. CONST. art. II, § 9
Missouri Mo. CONST. art. III, § 49
Montana MONT. CONST. art. m, § 4
Nebraska NEB. CONST. art. III, § 2
Nevada NEv. CONsT. art. XIX, § 2
North Dakota N.D. CONST. art. III, § 1
Ohio OHIO CONST. art. II, § I
Oklahoma OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 1
Oregon OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1
South Dakota S.D. CONST. art. III, § 1
Utah UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 1
Washington WASH. CONST. art. I, § I
Wyoming Wyo. CONST. art. III, § 52
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APPENDIX B: THE DECISIONS STUDIED
CASE NAME CITATION INITIATIVE INTERPRETIVE QUESTION
AT ISSUE
Benner v. 874 P.2d Tort Reform Whether word "party" in tort reform
Wichman 949 (Alaska Ballot statute included nonlitigant defendants
1994) Initiative
Morris v. 749 S.W.2d Initiated Act Whether private clubs dispensing
Torch Club, 319 (Ark. No. 1 of alcohol violated initiative's ban on
Inc. 1988) 1942 "giving away" alcohol in dry counties,
(alcohol such that a subsequent legislature-
regulation) enacted law that permitted service of
alcohol at clubs under specified
conditions had unlawfully amended the
initiative
People v. 684 P.2d Briggs Whether interpretation that finding of
Garcia 826 (Cal. Initiative felony-murder special circumstance
1984) (death required proof of intent to kill would
penalty) be applied retroactively
People v. 690 P.2d Briggs Whether two first-degree felony-murder
Turner 669 (Cal. Initiative convictions, neither of which could
1984) (death alone justify death penalty absent
penalty) finding of intent to kill, could together
I open door to death penalty hearing
People v. 691 P.2d Briggs How broadly to construe "murder for
Bigelow 994 (Cal. Initiative financial gain" death penalty special
1984) (death circumstance; how imminent should
penalty) arrest have been to justify murder-to-
avoid-arrest special circumstance; and
whether kidnapping-murder special
circumstance required proof of both
simple and aggravated kidnapping
People v. 694 P.2d Proposition 8 Whether defendant could receive
Jackson 736 (Cal. (criminal enhanced sentence for "burglary of a
1985) sentencing) residence" even though that particular
crime was not one contemplated by
statute; and whether new penalty
enhancement statute was limited by
another statute barring imprisonment
for more than twice the base term
The Yale Law Journal
CASE NAME CITATION INITIATIVE INTERPREIVE QUESTION
AT ISSUE
People v. Boyd 700 P.2d Briggs Whether evidence relating generally to
782 (Cal. Initiative defendant's character but not bearing
1985) (death upon any of specific aggravating or
penalty) mitigating factors listed in death
penalty statute was admissible
People v. 704 P.2d Proposition 8 Whether use of "and" instead of "or"
Skinner 752 (Cal. (criminal in definition of mental illness
1985) sentencing) established much stricter definition of
insanity defense
People v. 705 P.2d Briggs Whether statutory provision mandating
Weidert 380 (Cal. Initiative death penalty or life without parole for
1985) (death intentional killing of witness to prevent
penalty) testimony in criminal proceeding
applied when testimony was in juvenile
proceeding
People v. Fritz 707 P.2d Proposition 8 Whether trial court, in sentencing
833 (Cal. (criminal defendant previously convicted of
1985) sentencing) "serious felony" within meaning of
new statute, retained traditional
discretion to strike prior conviction
People v. 711 P.2d Briggs Whether "prior felony convictions" as
Balderas 480 (Cal. Initiative described in death penalty statute were
1985) (death limited to those occurring before
penalty) commission of capital crime
People v. 737 P.2d Briggs Whether death penalty special
Hendricks 1350 (Cal. Initiative circumstance implicitly required intent
1987) (death to kill; and whether being "previously
penalty) convicted of murder in the first or
second degree" acted as special
circumstance where conviction was for
murders committed after ones at issue
People v. 741 P.2d Proposition 8 Whether, under statute prohibiting
Woodhead 154 (Cal. (criminal commitment to Youth Authority of any
1987) sentencing) person convicted of serious felony,
phrase "no person convicted of'
included in its scope only defendant's
current conviction
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CASE NAME CITATION INTIATIVE INTERPRETIVE QUESTION
AT ISSUE
People v. 742 P.2d Briggs Whether initiative required court to
Anderson 1306 (Cal. Initiative give instruction that intent to kill was
1987) (death element of felony-murder special
penalty) circumstance
People v. 748 P.2d Proposition 8 Whether penalty enhancement could be
Guerrero 1150 (Cal. (criminal based on prior "burglary of a
1988) sentencing) residence" as mentioned in statute
when no offense specifically defined as
such existed in penal code
Evangelatos v. 753 P.2d Proposition Whether initiative limiting individual
Superior Court 585 (Cal. 51 (tort tortfeasor's liability for non-economic
1988) reform) damages to their percentage of fault
applied retroactively
People v. 755 P.2d Briggs Whether language of statute "while the
Guzman 917 (Cal. Initiative defendant was engaged in" should have
1988) (death been read as broadly as old version's
penalty) "during the commission of" and
"immediate flight after committing"
People v. 761 P.2d Briggs Whether qualification of felony murder
Griffin 103 (Cal. Initiative as special circumstance required
1988) (death premeditation
penalty)
People v. 771 P.2d Briggs Whether under death penalty initiative
Burton 1270 (Cal. Initiative "prior felony convictions" included
1989) (death juvenile adjudications
penalty)
In re Harris 775 P.2d Proposition 8 Whether, in sentence enhancement
1057 (Cal. (criminal provision, phrase "on charges brought
1989) sentencing) and tried separately" required that prior
convictions be brought in separate
proceedings
People v. 776 P.2d Briggs Whether phrase "would be punishable"
Andrews 285 (Cal. Initiative in death penalty statute should be read
1989) (death narrowly to mean must be punishable,
penalty) or broadly to mean may be punishable
Travelers 785 P.2d Proposition Whether mandatory renewal provision,
Indem. Co. 500 (Cal. 103 enacted as part of Proposition 103,
v. Gillespie 1990) (insurance applied to insurers who had submitted
regulation) applications to withdraw from state
insurance market
The Yale Law Journal
CASE NAME CITATION INITIATIVE INTERPRETIVE QUESTION
AT ISSUE
Taxpayers to 799 P.2d Propositions Whether two conflicting campaign
Limit 1220 (Cal. 68 and 73 finance reform propositions should be
Campaign 1990) (campaign given effect to extent possible, or
Spending v. finance) whether only measure receiving larger
Fair Political number of affirmative votes should be
Practices given effect
Comm'n
Curl v. 801 P.2d Briggs Whether defendant's statutory right to
Superior Court 292 (Cal. Initiative jury trial on truth of prior murder
1990) (death special circumstance allegation also
penalty) encompassed right to jury trial on
collateral challenge
Tapia v. 807 P.2d Proposition Whether provisions of Proposition 115
Superior Court 434 (Cal. 115 (Crime relating to conduct of trials applied to
1991) Victims' prosecution of crimes committed before
Justice initiative passed
Reform Act)
Whitman v. 820 P.2d Proposition Whether new hearsay provisions of
Superior Court 262 (Cal. 115 (Crime Proposition 115 authorized finding of
1991) Victims' probable cause at preliminary hearing
Justice based on testimony of someone without
Reform Act) personal knowledge of case
DaFonte v. Up- 828 P.2d Proposition Whether third party could be held
Right, Inc. 140 (Cal. 51 (tort liable for noneconomic damages
1992) reform) attributable to parties with statutory
immunity from liability
Yoshisato v. 831 P.2d Propositions Whether contrary provisions enacted in
Superior Court 327 (Cal. 114 and 115 Propositions 114 and 115 amending
1992) (criminal criminal statute, both dealing with
sentencing) death penalty special circumstances,
should both be given effect where
Proposition 114 received more votes
In re Littlefield 851 P.2d 42 Proposition Whether discovery statute authorized
(Cal. 1993) 115 (Crime court to order defense counsel to
Victims' disclose to prosecution address of
Justice defense witness, and if so, whether
Reform Act) court could sanction counsel for refusal
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CASE NAME CrrATION INTATIVE INTRRETIVE QUESTION
AT ISSUE
People v. Jones 857 P.2d Proposition 8 Whether Proposition 8 required that
1163 (Cal. (criminal prison sentence be enhanced both for
1993) sentencing) prior conviction and for prison term
imposed for current conviction
People v. 858 P.2d Proposition 8 Whether convictions in other states
Myers 301 (Cal. (criminal must have all elements of "serious
1993) sentencing) offense" crime in California to be used
for penalty enhancement
Gerken v. Fair 863 P.2d Proposition Whether, once provision of Proposition
Political 694 (Cal. 73 73 had been declared unconstitutional,
Practices 1993) (campaign any provision remained that was
Comm'n finance) severable and operative so as to
prevent Proposition 68, a competing
campaign reform initiative, from being
enacted
Grant v. United 509 A.2d Mandatory Whether defendant established
States 1147 (D.C. Minimum eligibility for sentencing under "addict'
1986) Sentencing exception to mandatory minimum
Initiative of sentencing statute
1981
Backman v. 516 A.2d Mandatory Whether term "narcotic" included
United States 923 (D.C. Minimum cocaine for purposes of criminal
1986) Sentencing sentencing exemption for narcotic
Initiative of addicts
1981
Abrams v. 531 A.2d Mandatory Whether phrase "while armed with" in
United States 964 (D.C. Minimum statute imposing mandatory minimum
1987) Sentencing sentence upon anyone convicted of
Initiative of crime of violence while armed with
1981 pistol or firearm required proof that
accomplice had actual, personal
possession of pistol or firearm during
crime
Smith v. 554 A.2d Mandatory Whether statute's enhanced penalty





The Yale Law Journal
CASE NAME CITATION INITIATIVE INTERPRETIVE QUESTION
AT ISSUE
Lemon v. 564 A.2d Mandatory Whether, pursuant to statute dealing
United States 1368 (D.C. Minimum with repeat armed offenders, mandatory
1989) Sentencing minimum sentence applied only if
Initiative of defendant was armed with firearm
1981 during commission of both predicate
and second offenses
Lucas v. 602 A.2d Mandatory Whether initiative's mandatory penalty
United States 1107 (D.C. Minimum enhancements for prior convictions
1992) Sentencing applied where prosecution failed to
Initiative of comply with separate legislature-
1981 enacted law requiring that pretrial
information list all prior convictions on
the basis of which prosecutor would
seek penalty enhancement
North Shore 471 N.E.2d Proposition Whether Proposition 2 , limiting state
Vocational 104 (Mass. 2 and local taxation and expenditures,
Regional Sch. 1984) (unfunded impliedly repealed earlier law requiring
Dist. v. City of mandates) that cities appropriate funds to regional
Salem school districts
Town of 552 N.E.2d Proposition Whether Proposition 2 , exempting
Norfolk v. 116 (Mass. 2 cities and towns from state regulations
Department of 1990) (unfunded resulting in imposition of additional
Envtl. Quality mandates) costs, applied to activities engaged in
Eng'g by private businesses, where
municipality voluntarily engaged in
those activities
Boston Water 562 N.E.2d Proposition Whether Boston Water and Sewer
& Sewer 470 (Mass. 2 Commission was city or town within
Comm'n v. 1990) (unfunded meaning of Proposition 2 and thus
Metropolitan mandates) eligible for certain tax limitations
Dist. Comm'n outlined in that statute
City of 625 N.E.2d Proposition Whether various statutes and
Worcester v. 1337 (Mass. 2 administrative rules and regulations
Governor 1994) (unfunded were "unfunded mandates" within
mandates) meaning of Proposition 2
People v. 364 N.W.2d Proposal B Whether Proposal B, stating that
Johnson 654 (Mich. (eligibility persons convicted and sentenced for
1985) for parole) certain crimes shall not be eligible for
parole until they have served minimum
term imposed by court, was applicable
to those with fixed or life sentences
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CASE NAME CITATION INITIATVE INTERPRETIVE QUESTION
AT ISSUE
State ex rel. 687 S.W.2d Proposition 1 Whether Proposition 1 intended to
Union Elec. v. 162 (Mo. (electricity create forfeiture for utility company in
Public Serv. 1985) rate event of abandoned construction
Comm'n regulation)
Swan v. 755 P.2d Initiative 81 Whether restaurant could be fined for
Montana Dep't 1388 (Mont. (alcohol unlawful "liquor" transaction involving
of Revenue 1988) regulation) wine where initiative amended
definition of liquor in alcoholic
beverage code to exclude "table wine"
State v. Gallant 764 P.2d Crime Whether shoplifting was "crime
920 (Or. Victims' Bill involving dishonesty" within meaning
1988) of Rights of evidence rule
SDDS, Inc. v. 481 N.W.2d Measure 1 Whether phrase "unless the Legislature
State 270 (S.D. (waste- enacts a bill approving the siting... of
1992) disposal such facility" referred to legislature's
facility actual passing of bill or to entire
siting) process of legislative enactment,
gubernatorial approval, and referendum
In re Estate of 692 P.2d Initiative 402 Whether effective date of initiative
Thompson 807 (Wash. (estate dealing with estate taxes was 30 days
1984) taxation) after election (pursuant to initiative
provisions in state Constitution) or later
date provided in text of initiative itself
Hi-Starr v. 722 P.2d Initiative 171 Whether specific language of liquor
Liquor Control 808 (Wash. (alcohol licensing initiative prohibited Liquor
Bd. 1986) regulation) Board from adopting additional rule,
not contemplated in act, in order to
further act's purposes
Estate of 724 P.2d Initiative 402 Whether estate was required to pay
Turner v. 1013 (Wash. (estate Washington estate tax although it was
Washington 1986) taxation) not required to pay any federal estate
State Dep't of tax
Revenue
City of Tacoma 816 P.2d 7 Initiative 62 Whether initiative limiting relationship
v. State (Wash. (state taxing between taxing power of state and local
1991) power) services prohibited transfer of services
traditionally handled by state without
reimbursement or transfer of any new
services without reimbursement
1995]
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CASE NAME CITATION INITIATIVE INTERPRETIVE QUESTON
AT ISSUE
Bird-Johnson 833 P.2d Initiative 97 Whether Model Toxics Control Act
Corp. v. Dana 375 (Wash. (Model created implied right of action for
Corp. 1992) Toxics contribution for recovery of remedial
Control Act) action costs
Washington 849 P.2d Initiative 207 Whether initiative dealing with
Fed'n of State 1201 (Wash. (state authority of state Personnel Board to
Employees v. 1993) Personnel generate salary and classification plans
Office of Fin. Board) impliedly repealed authority of Office
Management of Financial Management to "amend or
alter" state salary schedules
